

THE FLIGHT OF THE ANATOLIAN GREEKS: THE
ROLE OF SMYRNA IN ALLIED DIPLOMACY 1919

by
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DEDICATION

To my grandfather Dr. Lazare Jeannopoulos
who lived Anatolian politics of 1919

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INTRODUCTION

This essay takes its theme from the issues arising from Greece's claims to Smyrna. These claims were supported in part by promises given by the Allied Powers; sacrifices made by Hellenism during the war; and Greece's contribution to final victory. Emphasis will be given to the basis of Greece's claim which was the principle of nationalism or self-determination. This was a fundamental principle underlying the policy of the Peace Conference and it has its own moral justification. The principle of nationalism or self-determination was the primary reason for Premier Venizelos' claim to Smyrna.

Secondly, this essay deals with the decision of the Supreme Council which authorized the landing of Greek troops. The decision implicitly recognized the justice of the Greek claims and the likelihood that Smyrna and its hinterland would eventually be placed under Greek administration. Although the Greek contingent represented the largest numerically, it was an inter-allied military force which landed on May 15, 1919. The Allies however, after having committed Greece, were not willing to become militarily involved. War weariness and a realization that support of Greece would involve prolonged guerilla war which would

be costly in men and money, and perhaps would jeopardize their colonialist designs, were among the main Allied reasons for not supporting the Greek claims.

The Allies were primarily concerned with securing and protecting their own interests. Greece was merely a pawn on the great chessboard of international diplomacy and any benefits that a small country such as Greece would accrue would be incidental. The small concerns of Great Powers superceded the serious concerns of a small power.

Competition and conflict of interest amongst the Great Powers resulted in the lack of a common or unified Near Eastern policy and gave added impetus to the development of a Turkish opposition to the Allied plans for a political settlement in the Middle East.

It is to be noted that the League of Nations at the time of its inception failed to support the Greek claims and failed to prevent a gross violation of President Wilson's Twelfth Point in Smyrna.

I

THE PROMISES OF SMYRNA
AND
THE SACRIFICES OF GREECE

Venizelos was confident in the ultimate victory of the Allies and offered to enlist Greece in the cause of the Allies as early as August 18, 1914. He offered the services of his small country without asking for compensations. He asked only for safeguards against Bulgarian attack. His offer, however was rejected by the Allies because it was felt that he wished to attack Turkey.¹

By January, 1915 the Allies were anxious that Greece should become an Ally. On January 24, 1915, Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Asquith's Government offered Greece territorial acquisitions on the coast of Asia Minor. This proposal had the assent of France and Russia, and was not in response to a request from Venizelos.²

¹Joseph Ward Swain, Beginning the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1933), p. 421.

²David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference. Volume II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 779. (Hereinafter cited as Memoirs.)

Greece was thus encouraged to expect post-war annexations in Smyrna and western Asia Minor. The fact that Russia was one of the Allies made it inevitable that the territory offered to Greece should be in Asia rather than Europe, which was outside the range of Russian territorial aspirations. The attitude of Russia was a decisive factor in deflecting Greek ambitions to Asia Minor.³

After Venizelos' dismissal by King Constantine for his pro-Allied sympathies, Sir Edward Grey repeated this proposal on April 7, 1915 to the new Prime Minister, Gounaris. Growing impatient he asked that the decision for cooperation in the war against Turkey be made without delay, otherwise the Powers would consider themselves not obligated.⁴ Specific reference was made to the vilayet of Aidin or Smyrna and its hinterland in the note of April 9. The Allied offer of the Greek territory of Drama and Kavalla to Bulgaria however encouraged King Constantine to continue a policy of Greek neutrality.⁵

³Alexander A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture and After, 1915 - 1922 (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1937), p. 119 (Hereinafter cited as Greece's Anatolian Venture.) ; A. F. Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, Vol. I (Paris: Alcan, 1926), p. 199.

⁴Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 779.

⁵Ibid., p. 781.

The Allies at the time were negotiating with Italy to enlist that country's military support. A secret war-time treaty, the Treaty of London, was concluded on April 26, 1915. Italy thereby was assigned sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands, and equitable share of Anatolia, and a favorable partitioning of Albania. Although boundaries were left vague this agreement was to be the basis of Italy's claim to Smyrna and its hinterland.⁶

In 1916 King Constantine dissolved the Greek Parliament of which Venizelos had been Premier. After which Venizelos promptly fled to Crete. With British and French protection and support, Venizelos organized his revolutionary Committee of National Defense at Salonika and declared Greece an ally in the war against Germany and Bulgaria. On November 27, 1916 an Allied blockade coupled with intervention forced King Constantine's abdication. Venizelos, with the support of 30,000 Allied troops, returned to Athens and assumed political control. It is to be emphasized that he received Allied support because he tried actively to engage Greece in the war.⁷ A basic tenet of Venizelos' political platform was that by joining the Allied cause Greece would be permitted to liberate the Smyrna region.⁸

⁶Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 128.

⁷Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 785.

⁸Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 34, 67.

Lloyd George on April 19-21, 1917, in the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, induced Italy to assent to the Sykes-Picot Accord by offering Smyrna and the area north of it.⁹ The secret Sykes-Picot Accord provided for the postwar partition of Turkey into spheres of influence. Amongst its most important provisions Russia was to receive Turkish provinces of northeastern Asia Minor; France was to receive Syria and Adana; and Great Britain Mesopotamia, including Bagdad.¹⁰

Venizelos in a letter and memorandum to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George dated November 2, 1918 predicted that Italy would be the principle obstacle to Greece's Asiatic claims. He stated that the Treaty of London and the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement ought not be obstacles because the consent of Russia was necessary for the latter agreement to be binding. He reasserted Greece's claim to the whole of Asia Minor, from Makri opposite Rhodes to Artaki on the Sea of Marmara. He noted that "the establishment of Italy at Smyrna would result in a contradiction of the very principles in whose name the Allies are conducting the War."

⁹Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 785.

¹⁰Swain, Beginning The Twentieth Century, pp. 439-40.

He acknowledged that the offer of Smyrna and hinterland was not legally binding "being that promise was made under conditions that Greece has not carried out." He concluded pointing out his efforts to ally Greece with the Powers which included revolution and reiterated Greece's claim "in the name of principles for which the Allies are now fighting."¹¹

Lloyd George now held the opinion that Venizelos' establishment of the Committee of National Defense and the Greek contribution on the Salonika front at a crucial time "undoubtedly established a new claim for liberal recognition of the Greek peace aims."¹²

Anatole France predicted that it would be a bad omen for the future if Venizelos was made to suffer as a result of his having entered the war unconditionally and without guarantees.¹³ Although Allied promises were not set down in treaty form, the Allies had become morally bound to support Greece's territorial claims.

¹¹Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, pp. 76-94; Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, pp. 21-27.

¹²Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 791.

¹³The Times (New York), May 25, 1919, III, p.4.

The Great War imposed great sacrifices on the Greeks. The Greeks who dwelled in Asia Minor had long been subject to Turkish misrule and atrocities. With Turkey's entry into the war, the policy of de-nationalization or Turkification was pursued with greater vigor for security reasons. Many Greeks were massacred or deported to the interior of Anatolia.

Greek military forces sustained considerable casualties on the Macedonian front in fighting the Bulgarians. The Greek merchant marine which was the basis of the Greek economy lost nearly half its tonnage. Approximately forty-nine per cent of the Greek merchant marine was sunk by German submarines. This figure represents a greater percentage than Great Britain, which suffered losses totalling forty-three per cent.

The role that Greece played in securing Allied victory was not negligible. Greek forces numbering 250,000 fought on the Macedonian front with the French, English, Italians, and Serbians against the Bulgarians. Lloyd George noted that the Greek effort in Salonika "made the difference between victory and stalemate in a sector of the great battlefield which exercised a perceptible influence on the fortunes of the War as a whole."¹⁴

¹⁴Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 791; Sforza belittled the military value of the Greek contingents on Macedonian front; Count Carlo Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1930), p. 169.

General Franchet d'Esperey officially declared that the Allied victory in the Balkans was due to the Greeks who constituted fifty per cent of his forces. The sudden capitulation of Turkey was interpreted by some observers by the fact that the Turks were aware of the existence of the new Greek army of 150,000 men ready to advance on Constantinople by way of Thrace.¹⁵

¹⁵The Times (New York), May 25, 1919, III, p. 4; Sforza relates that he was told personally by the French Commander-in-Chief Franchet d'Esperey that the praises bestowed by the latter were nothing but "political necessities and tonics" Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, p. 169.

II

VENIZELOS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Venizelos and the Greek delegation arrived at Paris in December for the Peace Conference which was scheduled to begin in January, 1919. Premier Venizelos was optimistic not only because his country had been on the winning side by the end of the war but because he believed that the principle of nationalism and self-determination embodied in the twelfth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points would support Greece's territorial claims against the Ottoman Empire.¹

Venizelos' optimism was also sustained by the Allies' general understanding that Turkey would be dismembered and Constantinople internationalized. Venizelos was aware of inevitable conflicts amongst the Allies about the ultimate disposition of the territory of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of spheres of influence.² Realizing that his policy coincided with that of Great Britain, he recognized that Britain could best further the

¹Herbert Adams Gibbons, Venizelos (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), p. 354.

²Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), pp. 218-19.

aims of his country. Thus it was not mere chance which found the Greek delegation lodged in the Hotel Mercedes which was considerably closer to the headquarters of the British Peace Commission than to any other.³

The British Foreign Office on January 2, in a memorandum to the British Delegates proposed that:

In return for obtaining Eastern Thrace, Greece should be induced to renounce her claims to Smyrna, and an interchange might be effected between Turkish inhabitants of Western Anatolia.⁴

According to Lloyd George this was the first time that idea of an exchange of populations was suggested.⁵ Harold Nicolson of the British delegation wanted to compensate Greece in Asia Minor. Nicolson however was opposed to the cession of Western Thrace to Greece and desirous of giving the Struma frontier to Bulgaria.⁶

³Gibbons, Venizelos, p. 333.

⁴Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 795.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1933), p. 228; Nicolson was Secretary to the British Delegation at the Peace Conference.

Venizelos on January 14 submitted to the Supreme Council a signed memorandum of Greek claims to Northern Epirus, Thrace, vilayets in Asia Minor which included Smyrna, and islands in the Near East. These areas were claimed to be "geographically and historically integral parts of Greece." In addition the memorandum urged that Armenia, including Russian Armenia, be established as a separate state.⁷

On January 16 the British War Office General Staff submitted to the British peace delegates a memorandum entitled "Notes on the Greek War Aims." This document states that in 1914 there were 1 1/2 to 2 million Greeks in Asia Minor of whom over 600,000 inhabited the Smyrna (or Aidin) vilayet. Smyrna and its neighborhood were recognized as being indubitably Greek in 1912. The War Office, however, was of the opinion that the maximum claim or the granting of the whole area offered in 1915 was "ethnologically indefensible." It did not deny that the Greeks had an ethnologically just claim to part of the area included in the maximum

⁷The Times (New York) January 16, 1919, p. 4

Greek claim. The Turks, it is pointed out, have shown themselves to be unfit to govern Europeans. The War Office understood that the minimal Greek demand would be international guarantees for the autonomy of the Greek districts and for the protection of the civil rights of the Greeks living in the Turkish districts.⁸

Sir Harold Nicolson recorded in his diary that on January 22, Gerald Talbot, known to be a "friend of Venizelos," secretly related that Sidney Sonnino offered to support the Greek claim for the Dodecanese Islands and Smyrna provided that Greece surrender all claims to Northern Epirus.⁹

The British delegation was divided. Harold Nicolson was of the opinion that Greek claims in Asia Minor were just but did not consider them justifying the awarding the whole of Aiden vilayet and the Meander Valley. When the British delegates met on January 31, Hardinge wanted Turkey to retain Smyrna. Sir Eyre Crowe also opposed the Greek claim

⁸ Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, pp. 796-98.

⁹ Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 246; Commander Talbot of the British Navy was assigned to Venizelos while the latter was in England; Dimitri Kitsikis, Propagande et pressions en politique internationale: La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference de la Paix, 1919 - 1920 (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1963), p. 256. (Hereinafter cited as La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference.)

to Asia Minor, as did the British military advisors.¹⁰

On the morning of February 3, Venizelos accompanied by Nicholas Politis, the Greek Foreign Minister, appeared before the Council of Ten at the Quai d'Orsay. Accompanying them were their experts MM. Speranza and Rentis. President Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, and a Japanese representative were present to hear Venizelos' plea.¹¹ Premier Venizelos on behalf of his government presented claims to Northern Epirus, certain of the Aegean islands, Thrace and the seafront along western Asia Minor with Smyrna as its commercial and geographical center. Greece claimed all the islands of the Western Mediterranean including the Dodecanese, Imbros, Tenedos, Kastellorizon and Rhodes. Greece's claim to Cyprus was not discussed because Venizelos was convinced that the British Government would "be sufficiently magnanimous to surrender Cyprus to Greece." His claims were based upon the principle of nationalism.¹² Suffice it to say that the nationality

¹⁰Nicolson Peacemaking 1919, pp. 250, 253.

¹¹Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 222; The Times (New York) February 4, 1919, p. 2; David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (New York: Appeal Printing Company, 1924), XIV, p. 183. (Hereinafter cited as Diary.)

¹²Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 222; Miller, Diary, XIV, pp. 187, 190-91; The Times (New York) February 4, 1919, p. 2.

statistics justified awarding Greece the Isles, part of the vilayet of Brusa and of the vilayet of Aidin with the exception of the almost exclusively Turkish sandjak of Denizli.¹³

Appearing again before the Conference on February 4, Venizelos elaborated on Greece's territorial claims in western Asia Minor. He again stated that Greece's claims were based on President Wilson's Twelfth Point which he proceeded to quote.

Venizelos specified that the area claimed by Greece included the area west of a line drawn between Kastellorizon and the Sea of Marmora, excluding the Straits area.¹⁴

¹³Eleutherios K. Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference of 1919: A Memorandum Dealing with the Rights of Greece. "A revised translation from the French original (New York: Oxford Press, American Hellenic Society Publication no. 7, 1919) p. 21 (Hereinafter cited as "Greece Before the Peace Conference".

¹⁴Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 222; Miller, Diary, XIV, pp. 199-200; Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference; (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1947) III, pp. 868-69. (Hereinafter cited as Paris Peace Conference.)

Venizelos argued for the autonomy of the subject nationalities in those areas of the Ottoman Empire where they constituted a majority.¹⁵ He urged the separation of the Smyrna region from Turkey not only for ethnical reasons but argued that "geographically and historically it formed a specially distinct and separate region". To support this contention he quoted the German geographer Philipson whose book, Reisen und Forschungen im Westlichen Kleinasien, had made the same point.¹⁶

Venizelos admitted that the eastern portions of the area claimed by Greece had a Turkish majority. However, he said that the inclusion of territory with a Turkish population was necessary for economic reasons. Venizelos mentioned that a precedent for such a territorial arrangement was established in the case of Bohemia and its incorporation into Czechoslovakia.¹⁷

¹⁵Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 200.

¹⁶Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference" p. 22; Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 800; Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 201.

¹⁷Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 204.

As rulers, Venizelos denounced the Turks as:

A disgrace to civilization, as was proved by the extermination by them of 1,000,000 Armenians and 300,000 Greeks during the last four years in Asia Minor.¹⁸

Venizelos expressed his hope that Smyrna would serve as an enclave or refuge for the Christian Greeks of the interior. He proposed the reciprocal and voluntary interchange of the 922,000 Greeks who lived in the interior of Asia Minor for the Turks who inhabited Greek Asia Minor. The respective governments were, according to his suggestion, to purchase land and housing to recompense those who would migrate. Such an interchange would make each area more homogenous.¹⁹

Venizelos anticipated possible objection to the granting of Greece's claim in Asia Minor because of the vital economic importance of Smyrna for the trade with the interior of Anatolia. Venizelos therefore pointed out although other outlets were available, he would favor the establishment of a free port with international guarantees.²⁰

¹⁸Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 800; Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 205.

¹⁹Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 801; Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 205; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 872; Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference", p. 25.

²⁰Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 206; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 873; Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference", p. 24.

Venizelos said that there was "a natural tendency toward union" because of economic and cultural factors. Annexation to Greece and not autonomy was the preference of the Greeks in Asia Minor.²¹ Venizelos added that he did not anticipate military or administrative problems. Guarantees of the League of Nations would strengthen Greece's position. Venizelos asserted that, "The administrative responsibility would no doubt be heavy, but it would not exceed her (Greece's) powers."²²

Although Venizelos recognized that the promises of January, 1915, and those made after his retirement, had been conditional and were no longer binding, he asked that the Greek people should not be held responsible for what he considered the treacherous acts of the Greek King. He noted his own efforts on behalf of the Allied cause, which included a civil revolution. He reminded the Great Powers that he offered the services of his small country at the beginning of the war, before Turkey and Bulgaria had

²¹Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 207; Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference", p. 22.

²²Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 207; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 874.

entered the conflict while refraining from demanding territorial annexations.²³

Venizelos concluded with a rhetorical question:

How can one conceive that the democratic peoples, after the complete victory they have won in defense of the independence of the smaller nations and the right to self-determination, could place one of the most homogenous portions of the Greek nation under any foreign power whatever, simply because it happens to be a Great Power while Greece is only a small nation? How could they thus undermine, at the very base, the moral foundation of the Society of Nations?²⁴

At the conclusion of Venizelos' statement on February 4, Lloyd George moved that a Committee on Greek Territorial Affairs be established to examine the Greek claims as in the case of Rumania. It was to be composed of two representatives of each of the Big Four.²⁵

Venizelos' letter to Acting Prime Minister Repoulis on February 4 expressed optimism that his claims had been well-received. Venizelos noted that Orlando's comments were

²³Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 802; Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 208; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 874-75; Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference", p. 25.

²⁴Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference", p. 26.

²⁵Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 223; Miller, Diary, XIV, p. 209.

sympathetic and friendly. Repaulis was therefore asked to see that the anti-Italian campaign in the Greek press ended. Venizelos summed up by writing:

I consider it certain that we shall be given Smyrna, Kydonia and part of the hinterland which I cannot at present define. Also Cyprus and the Dodecanese at the expense of one or two islands and half of Northern Epirus.

While the future of Smyrna was yet undecided, Venizelos suggested the formation in Greece of a Smyrna gendarmerie and police units to be held in readiness. M. Sterghiades, the Commissioner of Epirus, was to be asked to assume the post of High Commissioner in Smyrna. Venizelos urged "utmost secrecy" about the role of the gendarmerie and police units that were to be formed.²⁶

²⁶ Doros Alastos, Venizelos: Patriot, Statesman, Revolutionary (London: P. Lund, Humphries and Company, Ltd., 1942), pp. 188-89. (Hereinafter cited as Venizelos.)

III

THE COMMITTEE ON GREEK TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

At the conclusion of Venizelos' oral presentation of Greece's claims on February 4, Lloyd George proposed the formation of a committee to study the question and to make recommendations. The British Prime Minister's motion was seconded by President Wilson. The committee as proposed was to be composed of two representatives of each of the Big Four. The Committee on Greek Territorial Claims' membership included Professors W. L. Westerman and Clive Day for the United States, Sir Robert Borden and Sir Eyre Crowe for the British Empire, MM. Jules Cambon and Gout for France, and M. de Martino and Coltoldi for Italy. M. Jules Cambon was unanimously chosen as Chairman and Sir Robert Borden as Vice-Chairman. Harold Nicolson was also present for the British Empire. Meetings of the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims were held intermittently from February 12 to March 8.¹

The initial meeting of the Greek Committee of February 12, which was concerned with Northern Epirus was adjourned because M. de Martino pleaded illness. Nicolson noted that

¹Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 223; Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 257, 261; Miller, Diary, X, p. 284, and XIV, p. 209.

when the motion for the formation of the committee was first made the Italian representatives on the Supreme Council "gasped" and were henceforth opposed to all proceedings of the committee. The presumable reason was that Italian claims were neither geographically nor ethnologically defensible. The Italians were piqued because they were of the opinion that Italian claims did not admit of discussion being that they were based on secret war-time treaties.²

The New York Times on February 12 reported that Italy was planning to occupy the Smyrna region with the consent of France, England, and Greece. Venizelos according to this account was conceding Italian occupation on condition that the Dodecanese Islands be transferred to Greece. Italy according to this agreement was to be permitted to retain Stampalia as a naval station. This agreement apparently accounted for the Italian military occupation of the region surrounding Smyrna at Adalia and Konya "at the suggestion of England and in accordance with France".³

At the February 18th and 19th meetings of the Greek Commission, the Allied representatives continued discussion of the Northern Epirus question. British and Americans were

²Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 257, 261.

³The Times (New York) February 12, 1919, p. 5.

in agreement. The French were of the opinion that Koritza should be awarded to Greece. Sir Eyre Crowe was inclined to agree, whereas Harold Nicolson reserved his decision. On February 20 the Greek Commission concerned itself with the Thracian boundary. All agreed in principle with the exception of Italy which was as usual "obstructive and sulky".⁴

It was not until February 21 that the Greek Commission addressed itself to Greek claims in Asia Minor. The Americans were opposed to the Greek claims, whereas the British were in favor. The Italians refused to discuss the question declaring that it was "not within our terms of reference" and that they had not received instructions from their government. The French members agreed that they favored a boundary roughly the same as the British drew. Proceedings were postponed until Italy would have instructions.⁵

The Greek Committee met next on February 24. Venizelos was summoned to answer questions. The British asked a number of questions. The Italians too asked several questions but their purpose was evidently to embarrass Venizelos. Chairman Cambon was moved to disallow some of these questions on the grounds that they were devised to put

⁴Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 263-264.

⁵Ibid., p. 266.

Venizelos in an uncomfortable position. Nicolson noted that Venizelos was frank, genial, and subtle.⁶

The Italian representatives at the Peace Conference consistently opposed all the Greek claims for territorial compensation whether in Asia Minor or Thrace. By a secret treaty of April 26, 1915, also known as the Treaty of London, Italy obtained recognition of her claims to Adalia and its hinterland. Boundaries purposely were left vague because the Allies at the time were negotiating with Greece. After Greece had definitely rejected the offer of the Allies and decided to remain neutral, the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement of April 19, 1917 extended Italy's zone so as to include Smyrna and a portion of the vilayet of Aidin.⁷

The Russian Revolution and the revelation of the secret wartime treaties and America's entry into the war made revision of these secret treaties necessary. Great Britain accepted this premise in principle but not Italy. Throughout the earlier stages of the Peace Conference, Italy insisted on her right to the possession of Smyrna and its hinterland as recognized in the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement.⁸

⁶Ibid., p. 268.

⁷Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 128.

⁸Ibid., p. 140.

Baker expresses the opinion that Orlando would have surrendered all Italian claims in Asia Minor for Fiume and hints that it was hoped that Fiume could be obtained by compromise of Italian claims in Asia Minor.⁹

The Italian representatives on the Greek Territorial Commission were so hostile to the Greek claims that they threatened to withdraw from the proceedings of the commission and remained only as silent observers.¹⁰ The Italians submitted reservations opposing Greek claims in Northern Epirus, Western and Eastern Thrace, as well as in Asia Minor.¹¹

Italy, it is to be noted, did not have the historic, geographic nor ethnologic rights in Asia Minor as did the Greeks. Whereas Greek claims were predominantly ethnographic, Italian interests were principally strategic and economic.

⁹Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1922), II, p. 199.

¹⁰H. W. V. Temperly, ed., A History of the Peace Conference at Paris (London: Henry Frowde, Hodder, and Stoughton, 1924), VI, p. 25; Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), p. 194.

¹¹Miller, Diary, X, pp. 296-300.

The Italians were of the opinion that although article 9 of the Treaty of London did not contain any precise geographical delimitation, a preliminary exchange of views was necessary before coming to a decision on the merits of the Greek claims. The Italians held that the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement was actually valid because "although subject to Russian ratification consent could not be given as Russia had ceased to exist."¹²

The Committee on Greek Territorial Claims met again on February 26, to discuss Greek claims in Asia Minor. Meaningless questions in regard to the protection of the Moslem minority were raised.¹³

During the Greek Commission session of March 1, Asia Minor was again discussed all afternoon. The Italian representatives said that they were surprised that France and Great Britain should consider assigning the Smyrna district to Greece when that district had definitely been promised to Italy. They stated that they would continue to sit with the committee but would not participate when questions of western Asia Minor or the Dodecanese were discussed. Sir Eyre Crowe speaking for Great Britain said

¹²Ibid., p. 300.

¹³Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 271.

that he did not consider the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement binding. In regard to the Treaty of London, he said the territory mentioned referred to the district of Adalia and not to the Smyrna district. M. Gout took the same general position but would not make any recommendations about the Dodecanese, which was the subject of an agreement with Italy. Westerman on behalf of his government said that the United States was not a party to the mentioned agreement and could not recognize its validity. Two French propositions were accepted by the British and the Americans. The first resolved that if the Peace Conference decided to grant the Greek claims in Western Asia Minor then the boundary line should be so to include Aivali on the northern coast, Soma, Kirk-Agatch, Alashehr, and finally Scala Nuova on the south coast. Secondly it was agreed that if the Greek claims are not accepted and if Anatolia was to be given as a mandate to a Great Power, this part of Asia Minor should not be put under the same power. Harold Nicolson gave Borden a paper to read to the effect that it was impossible to put the Greeks under a European mandate. Neither the British nor the French felt free to make recommendations. Westerman, speaking for the United States, stated that Greece's ethnical claims were justified. However,

the American attitude still remained opposed, apparently because of the vital economic importance of Smyrna.¹⁴

Harold Nicolson noted in his diary that the draft report of the committee's work for presentation to the Supreme Council which he wrote "bristles with reservations and minority reports."¹⁵

The controversy about whether the secret war-time treaties were binding or not resulted in much friction between Italy and the Allies. The Italians resorted to unilateral unauthorized landings in Asia Minor. The Italian attempt to secure their claims by a fait accompli was a factor of prime importance in influencing the Council of Three to send Greek forces to Smyrna.¹⁶

¹⁴House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 194; Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 223; Miller, Diary, XVII, pp. 105-106; Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 274-75; It was reported in The Times (New York) March 3, 1919, p. 3 that: "As regards Asia Minor, the commission agreed in principle that the strip of coast between Avali and Cos, including Smyrna and Ephesus, shall be assigned to Greece as full owner or as international mandatory."

¹⁵Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 275.

¹⁶Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 316.

The penultimate meeting of the Committee on Greek Territorial Affairs was held on March 4. In regard to the frontier with Albania the British agreed to the French frontier about Koritza. The Americans insisted on a modified line south of Vorussa, while the Italians wanted the 1913 frontier. On the question of the isles all agreed. In Asia Minor the British accepted the French line with reservations as to the Meander Valley. The American representatives, despite Westerman's admission that the Greek claims were ethnologically just, refused the awarding of any of this area.¹⁷

When the commission's report was being prepared the Italian representatives declined to make any recommendations "because the settlement could not be separated from the general solution of Anatolia as a whole, and because the regions to which Greece aspired had been to a large extent the subject of certain well known international agreements."¹⁸

Both the British and French delations were of the opinion that the ports of Smyrna and Aivali with a certain dependent region, could justifiably claim union with Greece

¹⁷Miller, Diary, X, p. 276.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 290.

on ethnic principles as well as for administrative and economic considerations.¹⁹

Venizelos was distressed that the American representatives were opposed to the claims of Greece in western Asia Minor. When Venizelos expressed his anxiety to Harold Nicolson at a private luncheon, the latter suggested that he wait patiently until President Wilson returned. Venizelos remarked optimistically that so long as he had the support of the British and the French he did not feel really anxious.²⁰

At the final meeting of the Greek Commission on March 7, Nicolson read his report which was adopted in principle. The Americans however insisted on some important changes. Nicolson the following day submitted the Greek Committee Report to Maurice Hankey.²¹

The American delegates dissented because they were not sufficiently impressed by the statistics and opposed the cession of Smyrna for economic reasons. The American experts thought the Greek population in Asia Minor to be lower than the Greek Government claimed. It was noted however that "the difference is not so great as to make a formal

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 290-291.

²⁰ Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 278.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 278, 280.

protest necessary." The American delegates declared that they did not accept the figures by the Greek Government of the Turkish population. Their own information led them to believe that the Greeks were in a decided minority in every sandjak of the area claimed except in the sandjak of Smyrna. American information agreed with that presented by the Italian delegates. Secondly the Americans dissented because they were of the opinion "that from an economic point of view it will be inequitable to separate the coastal districts of western Asia Minor from the Central Anatolian plateau, and so to sever what remains of the Turkish Empire from its most important natural exits to the sea." Smyrna was considered the principle and natural outlet for exports of the interior. Although the American representatives denied the Greek claim to Smyrna, they went on record as favoring the incorporation of the Dodecanese into the Kingdom of Greece.²²

Venizelos met Harold Nicolson on March 11 and read a letter that he was sending to President Wilson about Greek claims in Smyrna. Nicolson noted in his diary that the

²²Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, p. 49; House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 192; Miller, Diary, X, p. 291; The Times (New York) March 14, 1919, p. 2.

letter was "admirably written" and quoted Wilson's own speeches. Venizelos told Nicolson that he was "not opposed to the idea of receiving a very small enclave with the rest under mandate from the League of Nations." On March 16 Nicolson suggested "a scheme by which the mandate principle might be extended in preference to territorial cessions - because of lack of unanimity in the Greek Report."²³

Although the Council of Ten insisted on agreement, the reservations of the March 8th report were still held. Nicolson noted that the "matter is further complicated by our ignorance of what the Supreme Council is going to do with Constantinople itself. Obviously the extent of the Greek zone will be much affected by the extent of the Straits Zone, and by the nature of the administration there to be established."²⁴

Lloyd George received a communique from United States Secretary of State Colby in answer to his letter of March 12. Colby agreed that Eastern Thrace should be given to Greece with the exception of the northern part which was recognized as predominantly Bulgarian in population. In regard to Smyrna Colby wrote:

²³Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 284-85.

²⁴Ibid., p. 285.

The Washington Government have too limited information as to the exact arrangement that is contemplated for Smyrna, and the reasons for deciding upon this arrangement, to be in a position to express an opinion at present on this most important question.²⁵

The New York Times in a lengthy editorial of March 15 noted that the British delegation opposed moving the Turkish capital out of Europe for fear of the effect on the Moslem world. The Greek claim to Constantinople was not seriously pressed because of world interest in the Straits which has made internationalization most probable. American objection to the granting of Smyrna was not because of religious animosity but because of the commercial importance of the city. American opposition continued despite the fact that Venizelos promised commercial rights to the Turks. The editorial noted that the Americans had accepted such an accommodation in regard to Bulgaria and Thrace and that such an arrangement should prove satisfactory in Smyrna.²⁶

Venizelos on March 13 received a petition from the Greek and Armenian patriarchs at Constantinople which he was requested to present to the Peace Conference. The petition pleaded that the Greeks and Armenians should no longer be compelled to live under Turkish rule. The Armenian

²⁵Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 839.

²⁶The Times (New York), March 15, 1919, p. 14.

patriarch asked for the establishment of an Armenian state and expressed the hope that Thrace, Constantinople, the vilayets of Smyrna and Brusa and the sandjaks of Comedia and Bigha be incorporated into the Kingdom of Greece.²⁷

The report of the Committee on Greek Territorial Affairs was presented to the Central Committee on Territorial Questions on March 17. The French and British representatives urged acceptance of the report but were opposed by the United States and Italy. After considering the report no unanimous agreement was reached.²⁸ On March 20, however, it was decided by the Supreme Council to send a Commission of Inquiry and Research to Asia Minor "to obtain the wishes of the peoples themselves." Unfortunately this had not been suggested at an earlier date and meant the delay of the Turkish treaty. Meanwhile French-British relations were to become increasingly strained over Syria.²⁹

²⁷The Times (New York), March 14, 1919, p. 2.

²⁸Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 224; apparent misprint reads March 7 instead of March 17; Miller, Diary, X. pp. 286-92, also XVII, pp. 105-106, 193, 228-29; The Times (New York) March 14, 1919, p. 2.

²⁹Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 287; Nicolson notes that the proposal was dropped or the action postponed until July 21, *ibid.*

Westerman was bitter when he heard that "higher ups" had decided that the American delegation "must conform" to the British and French opinion in regard to granting territory in Asia Minor to the Greeks. On March 25, he wrote in his diary: "I held out in the Committee on Greek claims against the British and French decision to give a large chunk about Smyrna to the Greek Kingdom." He vigorously protested to Sidney E. Mezes, the Director of the Inquiry's Personnel, and sent a copy of his protest to Colonel House, because he thought that Mezes may have lied about the orders from the "higher ups".³⁰

Venizelos again visited Nicolson on March 27 to relate that Colonel House hinted personally that the United States would accept the Franco-British line in Asia Minor, and that he liked the autonomy scheme. The following day Nicolson and Arnold J. Toynbee agreed upon the frontier for the future Armenian state and on a joint line for the Greek Zone in Asia Minor which would be subject to some alteration if Italy was given a mandate in the same region.³¹

³⁰ Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 327.

³¹ Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 290-91.

Toynbee and Nicolson drew up a memorandum recommending that Greece should be given Thrace while leaving the whole of Anatolia to Turkey. Nicolson noted in his diary:

That as we have demobilized so quickly, and as people at home are bored by the future settlement, we shall be unable to put the Greeks into Smyrna. I mean keep them there. They can't hold it without allied support or unless the whole of Turkey behind them is split up among the Allied Powers. Yet if they do not get Smyrna Venizelos will fall from power.

This memorandum which proposed awarding to Greece, European Turkey only, was submitted to Sir Eyre Crowe who approved it and passed it on to Mr. Balfour for submission to the Supreme Council. This memorandum apparently was not submitted to the Supreme Council for no mention of their consideration is recorded in the minutes of the Supreme Council meetings.³²

The majority of the Greek Territorial Commission, it has been noted, were in favor of giving the whole of Eastern Thrace with the exception of a small territory east of the Chataldja lines which was to be left as hinterland for Constantinople. President Wilson however insisted that the northern half of Eastern Thrace, comprising the

³²Ibid. pp. 312-13.

districts of Adrianople and Kirk-Kilissa be given to Bulgaria. Alexander Pallis in his study claims that if Wilson had not so strongly opposed to the Greek claim to Eastern Thrace, it would have been easier for the Allies to have prevailed on Venizelos to relinquish his claims to Smyrna. Despite the fact that a majority of the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims favored the award he opposed it. Wilson's refusal held up the Turkish treaty and made it difficult for Venizelos to withdraw his claim without loss of prestige and serious risk to the local Greek and Armenian population.³³

³³Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, pp. 142, 144.

IV

THE DECISION FOR GREEK OCCUPATION

President Wilson and the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference played a crucial role in the settlement of Greek claims. Wilson however absented himself from the deliberations of the Peace Conference from mid-February to mid-March. In the latter part of March, the attitude of the American delegation changed, "perhaps on account of the fact that other members believed more strongly in Greek ambitions in Asia Minor. Westerman gained the impression that either House or Wilson, or House alone accepted the Smyrna proposal."¹ Wilson was apparently convinced by Venizelos' eloquence of the justice of the Greek claims.² Wilson was also fortified in his support of the Greek case because of the substantial Greek population of Smyrna.³

The Italians had landed troops at Adalia on March 26 without authorization from the Supreme Council. Their purported reason was to preserve order threatened by the escape of approximately two hundred civilian prisoners

¹Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 224.

²House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 191.

³Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 367.

earlier in the month.⁴ Here the pretext of protecting Italian citizens was apparent to the Allied statesmen.

Venizelos in a letter of April 12 to the President of the Peace Conference reported serious troubles at Smyrna and Aidin. Venizelos indicated that the situation in the vilayet of Aidin was becoming "more and more serious and threatening." The letter also indicated that the Greeks were subject to massacres, extermination, murders, robberies, and pillage. The Greeks suffered such abuses with the tolerance and sometimes even the complicity of the local authorities. The Greek population, Venizelos added, is the object of complete indifference on the part of the Allied authorities. The attitude of the Italian authorities, Venizelos noted, is not only indifferent but hostile. Venizelos urged strong immediate measures to restore order because:

I feel confident in affirming that if strong measures are not taken immediately to remedy this state of affairs, we shall soon have to deplore the worst catastrophe.⁵

On April 24 the Italian delegation left Paris in protest against President Wilson's attitude on the Fiume issue. It did not return until May 5. Italian policy

⁴The Times (New York) May 17, 1919, p.5

⁵Miller, Diary, XVIII, pp. 7-9.

thereupon sought to secure coveted areas by military occupation. Italian troops made unilateral, unauthorized landings in parts of Asia Minor and Fiume. Clemenceau, on the morning of April 30, announced that an Italian dreadnought had been sent to Smyrna that morning.⁶ He suggested the dispatch of an inter-Allied naval squadron. The Italian warships were ostensibly sent to safeguard Italian interests. Ray Stannard Baker mentions that informed opinion believed that the Italian aim was to promote disorders as cause for intervention at Smyrna.⁷

At the morning meeting of the Supreme Council on May 2 President Wilson was informed by Lloyd George that the Italins had sent a battleship, two cruisers and a destroyer to Smyrna. Lloyd George announced that he had received a telegram from the Central Committee of Unredeemed Hellenes at Athens, which indicated that the Turks were being "stimulated by some outside power" in their policy of oppression and massacre. The telegram concluded by asking that Allied troops be sent for protection. Lloyd George mentioned that he had sent Lieutenant Harmsworth to show

⁶Ibid., XIV, p. 558; According to U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 354, other meetings were known to have been held but no minutes appear in U.S. State Department files.

⁷Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, pp. 189-90.

this telegram to Venizelos.⁸

Venizelos responded that it was undoubtedly Italy which was inciting the Turks. Although Wilson noted that the Italians would probably announce that they were sending the battleships to protect their compatriots, such reports strengthened the view that an Inter-Allied force should be sent to Smyrna. Lloyd George suggested that Great Britain, France, and the United States should all send forces. Lloyd George indicated that a British battleship from the Black Sea would be available. Wilson said he would see Admiral Benson about sending an American warship.⁹

At the afternoon session of the Big Three Wilson said he had arranged for an American battleship of the latest type to be sent from Brest to Smyrna. Lloyd George announced that he also ordered a ship to be sent. Lloyd George mentioned that Venizelos wanted to send Greek naval vessels but that he had advised him to wait until the ships of the Allied and Associated Powers had arrived. Clemenceau noted that France had a battleship on station at Smyrna. When Lloyd George asked whether an announcement should be made about naval movements being made in consequence

⁸Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 560.

⁹U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 412-13.

of the massacres of the Greeks by Turks, the proposal was dropped at Clemenceau's urging.¹⁰

Venizelos dined with Harold Nicolson May 2 and they discussed the effect of the Italian political crises upon Greek claims. When Nicolson commented that he was fearful that Italy would be given "compensations" in Anatolia for what she is forced to surrender in the Adriatic Venizelos sighed deeply and said: "I have received assurances of comfort and support from Lloyd George and Wilson."¹¹ Venizelos expressed the view that if Italy was given a protectorate in Asia Minor, Greece should have the Smyrna zone, plus Aivali, and the remainder of his claims under a similar mandate. Nicolson records in his diary that Venizelos "indignantly repudiated" the rumor that Greece be given Constantinople as an inducement to surrender Smyrna.¹²

The Supreme Council continued to receive reports of the imminent seizure of Smyrna by the Italians and reports of maltreatment of the Greeks by the Turks.¹³ By May 5 there was

¹⁰U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 422.

¹¹Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp. 321-22.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 387.

much anxiety about the possibility of an Italian landing because it was reported that the Italians had occupied the harbor of Marmaris and had landed forces at Adalia. Baker notes that Lloyd George was alarmed and proposed "an immediate redistribution of the armies of occupation in the east, with the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops."¹⁴

Sir Maurice Hankey makes the point that Lloyd George asked that the Greeks be permitted to occupy Smyrna because their compatriots were being massacred. Clemenceau said that the Italians already had seven battleships at Smyrna. Lloyd George was anxious that arrangements be completed before the Italian delegation could return to Paris. When President Wilson said that he could not make the necessary arrangements so hastily, Lloyd George expressed apprehension that the Italians might anticipate their decision. Lloyd George urged speedy arrangements as necessary to forestall the Italians before they were faced with a fait accompli.¹⁵

The Supreme Council meeting on May 6 continued to express apprehension about the imminence of an Italian landing. Clemenceau's announcement of the previous day indicated that

¹⁴Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p. 191; Miller, Diary, XIX, p. 558.

¹⁵Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p. 192; U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 467.

the Italians intended to land troops. It was rumored that Italy was instigating trouble between Greece and Turkey, and having done so would land troops with the ostensible object of keeping peace. Lloyd George suggested that Venizelos be allowed to land two or three Greek divisions at Smyrna. President Wilson pointed out that the report of the Greek Commission was now unanimously in favor of giving this area to Greece. Clemenceau announced that he was ready to permit the landing of Greek troops. President Wilson concurred with the French Premier. When Lloyd George asked that Venizelos might be authorized to send troops to be kept on board ship at Smyrna ready for landing in case of necessity, President Wilson asked why they should not be landed at once as the men would not keep in good conditions on board ship.¹⁶

The Supreme Council had decided to authorize the landing of Greek troops and the occupation of Smyrna "by purely Greek forces" at its morning meeting on May 6 at President Wilson's residence. The Supreme Council at its afternoon session at the Hotel Astoria made further authorization: (1) to notify General Franchet d'Esperay; (2) order one Greek division to embark at Salonika; (3) order the

¹⁶ Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 387; U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 483-84.

preparation of another Greek division; (4) collect transport; (5) formulate necessary civil safeguards; (6) maintain necessary communication between Greece and Smyrna. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson decided "that these troops are under Greek Command and in no sense under International Command except possibly during the sea-transit," The Big Three recognized that their decision might arouse Italian and/or Turkish opposition. Surprisingly, the Big Three was "not sure whether such action is covered by the Armistice Terms."¹⁷

Venizelos telegraphed the Greek Minister in Constantinople on May 6:

Please communicate confidentially to the French Commander-in-Chief that this morning I was informed by the Prime Ministers of England and France and the President of the U.S.A. that they have decided to occupy Smyrna immediately, entrusting the actual occupation to the Greek army.¹⁸

On the same day Venizelos sent secret telegrams to M. Repoulis in Athens and General Paraskevopoulos in Salonika, asking that arrangements for the transport of the First Greek Division to Ionia be made with the utmost secrecy. Venizelos

¹⁷U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 504; May 6th afternoon meeting was attended by Venizelos, Admiral Hope, General Belin, General Bliss, and General Sir Henry Wilson; ibid.

¹⁸Alastos, Venizelos, p. 191, cites as source Athenaika Nea, May 15, 1936.

arranged for the dispatch of gendarmes to Chios, and advised M. Sterghiades to be ready.¹⁹

Lloyd George informed Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson of the Big Three decision on May 6. Lloyd George explained that speed was necessary because the Big Three thought Italy "up to tricks." When Henry Wilson asked Lloyd George if he realized that such a step risked starting a war, the question was brushed aside. Henry Wilson, as instructed, made arrangements with Venizelos, General Bliss, and Admiral Hope to send one or two Greek divisions to Smyrna. Henry Wilson recorded in his diary that he "insisted on the fact that it was a Greek affair, under Greek command, and that there was danger of opposition both from the Italians and the Turks, and that both Governments ought to be warned."²⁰

The discussions continued on May 7 at Lloyd George's residence in the Villa Majestic. Venizelos in answer to questions asked by Lloyd George, noted that there were two

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 192; Emmanuel Repoulis was Acting Prime Minister during Venizelos' absence; Arstedes Sterghiades was appointed civil governor of Smyrna by Venizelos on May 21, 1919.

²⁰ Sir Charles Edward Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), II, pp. 189-90.

Greek divisions available without weakening the Allied position in Macedonia. He added that Greek troops from Thrace could not be spared until Greek troops had returned from Russia. General Wilson expressed the opinion that there were no very formidable forces in the Smyrna region. President Wilson supposed that the Armistice gave the Allies the right to send troops. Venizelos stated that more than 30,000 Greek citizens were in danger. General Wilson said that it was true that the Allies had the power to land troops. President Wilson said that if Greek troops were sent, the Italians could hardly land troops unless they intended to break with the Allies.²¹

General Wilson raised the question of the command of the troops. They were no longer to be under the command of General Franchet d'Esperey, or General Milne, or any other Allied commander. He noted that the Greeks "would constitute an allied force under Greek command." Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and President Wilson indicated their agreement.²²

²¹U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 501-502.

²²Ibid., p. 502.

President Wilson raised the question as to whether the Turkish government ought to be warned of the Allied intention to land troops. Venizelos thought they should, but only on the eve of the landing. He explained that there should be no warning, except just before the event so as to eliminate the possibility of resistance. Venizelos pointed out that such an operation was not without risks. Lloyd George asked whether there was not a danger that the Commander of the Fort might fire on Greek ships when the landing began. Venizelos answered saying that the danger would be in their firing from the forts when the ships were entering the Gulf of Smyrna. President Wilson thought they would not fire on transports. Venizelos agreed with Wilson, but suggested that it would be best if Greek transports were conveyed.²³

Clemenceau favored warning the Turks. Wilson agreed that this would be the correct procedure but he added that if the Turks were warned too far in advance they would make preparations for resistance. It was agreed that Admiral Hope

²³Ibid.

was to make the logistic arrangements for the carrying out of the plan. Secondly, it was decided that Venizelos was to collect as many Greek transports as possible at Kavalla, and to hold Greek troops in readiness to embark.²⁴

Sir Henry Wilson's diary entry of May 7 mentions that although Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Wilson, and Venizelos wanted secrecy, he strongly insisted that the plan was "quite impossible" and wrong. He referred to the plan as being "mad and bad."²⁵ It is indeed a curious omission if he felt so strongly that no mention of his opposition was published in the United States Department Papers dealing with the Paris Peace Conference.

In the continuing discussions of May 10 and 12 the principle of landing was assumed to be settled and only practical details were discussed.²⁶ Much of the discussion of May 10 was concerned with the length of the advance notice that should be given the Turks and means for handing over the forts.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 502-503.

²⁵Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, II, pp. 190, 192.

²⁶Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 387.

It was agreed that the entire transport, escort, and landing operation would be under the supreme command of Admiral Calthorpe, who was the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the eastern Mediterranean. Admiral Calthorpe was to be at Smyrna just prior to and during the operations. It is noted in the United States State Department Papers that Clemenceau reiterated that the Greeks were under their own command.²⁷

The Big Three also agreed that the Turks would be given twelve hours notice to be issued locally by Admiral Calthorpe. The Turks were to be informed that "allied troops will be landed at Smyrna in accordance with the armistice terms" and that the occupation was taking place because of reported disorders in the Smyrna region. Admiral Calthorpe was to be informed that the forts were eventually to be handed over to the Greeks. It was also agreed that the landing parties were to be entirely French to avoid mixing of nationalities. The real reason was to eliminate Italian troops from making the landing.²⁸

²⁷U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 554-58.

²⁸Ibid.

On the morning of May 12 Clemenceau casually informed Orlando about the decision of the Big Three. Lloyd George and Clemenceau in their feigned embarrassment explained that the initiative had come from the Greeks. Clemenceau explained:

There was no question of making a repartition affecting Smyrna, but we desired that the Greeks should be able to land to protect their co-nationals from massacres; many such had lately taken place.²⁹

When Clemenceau said that the landing had been ordered at the request of the Greeks, President Wilson interrupted, saying that the original suggestion had not come from the Greeks but from the Council of Three to prevent massacres. Lloyd George said that Sir George Riddell had received a letter from a British resident of Smyrna which gave "a very bad account of Turkish atrocities on the Greeks, which included massacres and tortures."³⁰ Lloyd George noted that the Italians had already landed at Makri, Marmaris, Budrum, and Scala Nuova. Clemenceau included the Italian landing at Adalia. Orlando excused himself on the ground that he wished to consult with Foreign Minister Sonnino.³¹

²⁹Ibid., pp. 570-71.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

At the afternoon session of the Supreme Council, Orlando said that he accepted in principle the decision about the landing but suggested "leaving the troops of the Principle Powers on shore, and not to withdraw the British, French, and Italian detachments, pending the final decision as to the disposal of Smyrna."³² Although the decision about landing did not include agreement about Greece and rival claims, the reality of the decision was evident to Sonnino. He remarked that the retention of the Allied parties on shore would give the expedition an international character.³³

Lloyd George made it clear to the Italian delegation that the Greeks would be in command inasmuch as their contingent would be the largest. Lloyd George added that Sir George Riddell's correspondent of whom he had spoken earlier, had himself seen Turkish troops firing at the Greeks, and he had seen two innocent persons shot without provocation. President Wilson considered a joint occupation unwise. It was agreed that the Greek force should start from Kavalla as soon as ready and that an Italian detachment should participate.³⁴ Baker and Churchill both mention the fact

³²Ibid., pp. 577-78

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

that at the afternoon session of May 12 Clemenceau consoled Orlando by reiterating "that the landing was without prejudice to the ultimate dispossession of Smyrna" and that it was an emergency measure.³⁵

At the May 13 afternoon meeting President Wilson said he would like Smyrna and the adjacent district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission, to be united with Greece. Wilson expressed himself favorable to a Greek mandate for the remainder of the territory claimed by Venizelos.³⁶

Lloyd George suggested that the United States should take a mandate for Armenia; France should take a mandate for Northern Anatolia; Italy should be given a mandate in southern Anatolia; and that Greece should be dealt with as proposed by Wilson. Lloyd George expressed the hope that the United States would accept a mandate for Constantinople. Wilson stated that he could not settle the question until he had returned to the United States

³⁵Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p. 194; Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 387.

³⁶U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 583-84.

and had ascertained whether the United would accept a mandate. Wilson repeated that he thought the Greeks ought to have a mandate outside the purely Greek Zone. He explained that the whole district included in the western slope of the mountains formed a geographic unit and should not be divided among several nations.³⁷

At the May 13 afternoon session Wilson's pro-Greek attitude was surprising in contrast to Lloyd George's attitude. For example, when Wilson asked if his proposal for a Greek mandate for Smyrna and its hinterland was acceptable, Lloyd George said that his "only fear was that the Mohammedan population was a very fierce one, and he doubted if the Greeks could handle it."³⁸ President Wilson explained for Harold Nicolson, at that time the assistant to the British representative on the Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs, Sir Eyre Crowe, that his proposal was to unite Smyrna and the surrounding district to Greece. He noted that this had been proposed in the report of the Greek Commission as subsequently modified by agreement between the British and American experts so as to exclude

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 584, 586.

the Meander Valley and the area south. In addition Wilson explained that he meant to give Greece a mandate over the larger area which should be considered as a geographical unit.³⁹

These decisions formed part of the peace settlement with Turkey, however, the future of Turkey at this time was not decided. Wilson's proposals and the Smyrna decision were to be modified by the course of events. According to Thompson, the decision for the Greek occupation of Smyrna signified the dismemberment of Turkey.⁴⁰ Lloyd George on May 14 proposed a plan for the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire. In the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council the Greeks were to have full sovereignty over Smyrna and Aivali, the Dodecanese, and Kastellorizon. In addition Greece was to have a sphere of influence in the rest of the area claimed, with a Greek mandate for the territory adjacent to Smyrna. The plan provided that America would accept a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia.⁴¹ British Cabinet

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Charles T. Thompson, The Peace Conference Day by Day (New York: Bretano's, 1920), pp. 373-74.

⁴¹Miller, Diary, XIX, pp. 559-60, 570.

discussions of May 19 indicated that there was not yet agreement about the Turkish settlement. Much concern was expressed about the effect of any decision on Moslem feeling within the British Empire, especially India.⁴²

Subsequent historians have criticized the Supreme Council's decision on the ground that Venizelos falsely presented telegrams pleading that Greek troops be sent to prevent massacres and atrocities. These reports or charges were found to be false or exaggerated. Nonetheless, the available evidence indicates that the Supreme Council decision had been made primarily to forestall an Italian landing. Implicit in the desire to prevent the Italians from occupying Smyrna, and in light of the valid Greek claims based on nationality was the fact that an Allied landing was a necessary prelude to a Greek occupation of Smyrna.

It is to be noted that in the Supreme Council's decision about the landing it was not specified that the Smyrna occupation was to be temporary. Explanations were offered to Orlando on May 12, and to Turkish authorities on May 14, which indicated that the occupation was an emergency measure to prevent massacres. This wording was

⁴²Ibid.; Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 343; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 622-23, 614-16.

probably meant to calm Italian and Turkish passions.

The French Government had reasons for being more obligated than any of the other Allied governments to give wholehearted support to Greece's claims at the Peace Conference. The French Government had interfered in Greek politics by backing Venizelos in an effort to enlist Greece as an ally. In June, 1917 France assumed the role of Allied policeman in Greece by sending M. Jonnart as High Commissioner to Athens to dethrone King Constantine and reinstate Venizelos. It was France which had enlisted Greek forces on the Salonika Front.⁴³

At the Peace Conference the French attitude was reluctant to authorize the sending of Greek forces. It was felt that Great Britain would gain a dominant influence at Constantinople. French reservations were made clear in the ensuing discussions over the command of forces.⁴⁴ The deciding factor in securing Clemenceau's consent was the Greek participation with French troops in the anti-Bolshevik campaign in Odessa. In March, 1919 French troops had deserted

⁴³Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 97.

⁴⁴Albrecht-Carrie in Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 316, refers to French reservations as specifying that forces were to be under Greek command.

in large numbers and a hasty evacuation had been necessitated. The Bolsheviks threatened to gain control of South Russia and to advance through Rumania into the Balkans. Greek troops saved Allied military prestige, and were fortunate to avoid a military catastrophe for which the French would have been responsible.⁴⁵ And in the mutiny of the French Black Sea Fleet approximately five hundred Greeks had lost their lives.⁴⁶ As a result of the Allied intervention in the Ukraine not only were two Greek divisions decimated but the Greek community in Russia suffered pillage and massacres as reprisal.⁴⁷

These commitments and sacrifices helped to secure French approval. The Big Three between May 5 and May 11 secretly made their decision to commit Greek forces.⁴⁸

⁴⁵John F. Carter, Jr., "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece," The Unpartizan Review, XIV (October, 1920), p. 310.

⁴⁶Alastos, Venizelos, p. 188.

⁴⁷S.P.P. Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, trans. by E.W. and A. Dickes (New York: Bretano's, 1928), p. 300.

⁴⁸Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, VI, p.25.

Baker mentions the possibility that Smyrna might have been promised to the Greeks in the agreement for Greek participation in the anti-Bolshevik campaign. He notes this possibility even though he is aware that Clemenceau had proposed concessions to Italy as early as April 21 and had referred to Smyrna as falling to the Greeks.⁴⁹ Venizelos in a letter to a biographer fifteen years later justified Greece's participation in the Allies intervention in Russia as the price for French support of Greece's claims in Anatolia and Thrace.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p. 191.

⁵⁰Alastos, Venizelos, p. 188; Alastos notes that the expulsion of the French and the Greeks from the Ukraine was evidence that the ability of the Allied powers to enforce their will was dissolving, *ibid.*

V

THE ARMISTICE OF MUDROS

Following the surrender of Bulgaria, Turkish emissaries on October 8, 1918 went out from Smyrna on a peace mission. They negotiated the armistice which was signed for the Allies by Vice-Admiral Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe of the Royal Navy. The armistice, signed October 30 aboard the battleship, H.M.S. Agamemnon, stationed off Mudros, near the island of Lemnos, became effective on November 4.¹

The Armistice did not represent unconditional surrender and its terms were lighter than those imposed upon the other belligerents. It was notable in that it did not provide for an immediate surrender of arms and ammunition.² Count Sforza has indicated that the Armistice had been hastily concluded because the British did not want General Franchet d'Esperey, the French Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East, to occupy Constantinople and exercise military control there. Because the Armistice had been

¹E. G. Mears, ed. Modern Turkey (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), pp. 553, 624; The Armistice of Mudros is included as a document in Appendix B.

²Ibid., p. 554.

hastily concluded it did not "impose" upon the Turks "either precise nor serious conditions as to disarmament, disbanding of troops, nor penalties against, or the removal of certain heads of the party, Union and Progress."³

The Armistice did not specify disarmament. Article 20 provided: "Compliance with such orders as will be conveyed, regarding the disposal of the equipment, arms and ammunition, including the transport of the portion of the Turkish army to be demobilized under clause 5."

Of the Armistice's twenty-five articles the terms of seven were strictly naval in provision. Despite the fact that the Greek minority suffered persecution during the war no assurances for their protection were included. Article 4 provided for the release of Armenian prisoners and Article 5 provided for Allied occupation of the six Armenian vilayets in the event of disorders.

Article 7, which was used as justification by the Supreme Council to authorize the Greek landing, gave the Allies "the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies."

³Count Carlo Sforza Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), p. 51. Hereinafter, cited as Diplomatic Europe; Idem, Makers of Modern Europe, p. 355.

The rejoicing of the Anatolian Greeks at the Allied victory angered the Turks. When the small British battle-ship, H.M.S. Monitor, entered Smyrna harbor on November 6 there were joyful demonstrations. The Greeks suffered as a result of Turkish fanaticism. At Soma, south of Smyrna, some Greek schoolboys were beaten to death for singing national songs. Turkish police entered Greek homes and churches to order removal of national flags. Greeks were beaten and insulted. The Greeks appealed to Commander Allen Dixon, Commander of the Royal British Marine and Allied Commander-in-Chief. Only after Commander Dixon inquired about the complaints did the abuses stop.⁴

The American Minister in Athens, Garrett Droppers cabled the Acting Secretary of State on December 4th in regard to petitions he received. He notified the American Government that the American Embassy in Athens had received innumerable petitions from Greeks for the redemption of their fellow country from the Turks. Concern was shown for the Greeks in Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, Thrace, and especially in the Smyrna district.⁵

⁴Annie C. Marshall, "Impressions of Smyrna in War-Time," Contemporary Review, March, 1919, p. 335.

⁵U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, II, p. 275.

The Greek Legation notified the United States State Department on December 6 that popular demonstrations by those who felt liberated had aroused Moslem fanaticism. It was noted that the Allied Representatives "refrain from seeing to the strict execution of the terms of the armistice" and that the "disarming of the Turks has not even begun". The Smyrna area was reported to be terrorized by bands of outlaws comprised of deserters or of soldiers discharged with their arms. The unarmed Christians were defenceless. The men of Rhami Pacha, ex-Vali of Smyrna, "behave towards the Christians in an arrogant way so as to create disturbances. Brigands walk the streets of Smyrna without intervention from the allied authorities who merely declare that they cannot take any action."⁶

The Allies had not occupied Smyrna with their own troops. The war in this part of Anatolia had been limited to a naval blockade.⁷ The safety of the Greek population therefore could not be guaranteed by naval forces alone. Some accounts assert that the terms of the Armistice were being observed until the Greek landing. These accounts.

⁶Ibid., p. 276.

⁷Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 382.

indicate that this compliance applied only to areas under military occupation.⁸ Harold Armstrong, a Special Service Officer in the British War Office and a member of the Headquarter Staff of the Allied Army of Occupation and Supervisor of the Turkish Gendarmerie, admits that disarmament of Turkish forces was neglected by Allied Commanders.⁹ Disarmament was nominal even in regions under effective Allied occupation. Disarmament in the interior was impossible to enforce. Alfred Rawlinson entitled chapter VI of his Adventures in the Near East "The Turkish Armistice a Fiasco-Foundation of the Nationalist Party."¹⁰

The Earl of Ronaldshay's biography of Lord Curzon indicates that:

The terms of the Armistice granted to Turkey had been neither so comprehensive nor so severe as Lord Curzon himself had advised. And three months' neglect at the hands of the Peace Conference had already resulted in a serious deterioration in the situation.¹¹

⁸Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth R. Kirkwood, Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 93.

⁹Harold Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, (London: John Lane, 1925), p. 85.

¹⁰Alfred Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company 1924).

¹¹Lawrence John Lumley Dundas Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1928) III, p. 264.

Despite the fact that Venizelos based Greece's claim to Smyrna on the principle of nationality he was accused of being an imperialist. Venizelos' critics, who generally accuse him of being imperialistic, in addition to implying that the Greek element was in a minority in the area claimed, imply that the desire to protect the unredeemed Greeks was a pretext and not a valid reason for desiring the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops. The harsh history of the Turkish policy of assimilation or extermination in regard to minorities certainly justified Venizelos' fears.

Turcophile authors supply evidence that the terms of the Armistice were not being observed by the Turkish nationalists. Clair Price notes that the General Staff, before the Greek landing had dispatched agents to the eastern provinces for the formation of local defense committees. These defense committees formed the basis of the Nationalist Party. The defense committees were not directed against the Allies but against Damad Ferid's Government and his program of partitioning Turkey in favor of the Greeks and the Armenians.¹²

¹²Clair Price, The Rebirth of Turkey (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1923), pp. 133, 135.

Noureddine Pasha, the Turkish commander of Smyrna, felt "assured that in the event of a foreign invasion there would be some effectual resistance". Edib notes that although he was recalled it was indicative. A secret revolutionary society called "Karakol", meaning "The Guard", arose in Constantinople to oppose the dismemberment of Turkish areas. In Constantinople "Karakol" was headed by Kara Vassif Bey. Major Kemaleddine Sami and other Turkish officers stole arms, ammunition, and other military equipment from depots which were supposedly controlled by the British and the French. Arms were smuggled into Anatolia: 320 machine-guns, 1500 rifles, a battery, 2000 boxes of ammunition, 10,000 military uniforms, etc. were smuggled into Anatolia before the Greek landing.¹³

It was evident in 1919 that the disarmament provisions of the Armistice had not been carried out. The Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople made representations to Damad Ferid Pasha, who sent Mustapha Kemal to investigate. In the late spring, prior to the Greek landing, Kemal was detailed as Inspector-General in Anatolia. Kemal was to be in charge of the skeleton forces which General Milne, the Allied Commander-in-Chief had sanctioned at Erzerum and Silvas for gendarmerie purposes. Instead of enforcing

¹³Halide Edib, The Turkish Ordeal (New York: The Century Company, 1928), pp. 19-21.

disarmament, Kemal, together with Bekir Pasha, who was already at work, organized resistance.¹⁴

The Armistice as mentioned did not provide protection for the Greek population of Asia Minor. Pacification was necessary and this was what Venizelos urged. The Allies who were not amenable to the idea of assuming this burden were however inclined to commit Greek forces for this purpose.

Much mystery remains concerning the Allied decision to land Greek troops. It is difficult to determine to what extent Venizelos and/or the Big Three are responsible for instigating the action. Regardless of the answer to this question the Supreme Council must in the final analysis be held responsible for the decision and its enforcement.

In light of the fact that Venizelos claimed Smyrna, it is unlikely that he would discourage such a decision especially if Allied support was implied. According to Churchill, Venizelos went to Smyrna "as readily as a duck will swim".¹⁵ Venizelos, did indeed, express anxiety for the safety of the Anatolian Greeks. His concern most certainly had a material effect on the decision of the Supreme Council and could have been interpreted as encouragement.

¹⁴Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp. 315-16; Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, p. 557.

¹⁵Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 387.

A most important factor in the decision of the Supreme Council was the desire to forestall what appeared to be the imminent Italian occupation of Smyrna. The war-weary Allied powers were reluctant to commit their respective troops in Asia Minor and therefore were disposed to the assumption of this burden by Greek forces. In light of the soundness of the Greek claims and the likelihood that Smyrna eventually would be placed under Greek administration such an arrangement seemed most agreeable.

VI

THE PROBLEM OF POPULATION STATISTICS

The Greek claim to Smyrna was based upon the principle of nationality. Venizelos claimed that the Greek population in Smyrna and its hinterland constituted a majority of the population and for this reason, in addition to others, the region should be granted autonomy. The Greek case utilized available statistical studies to support its claim. Unfortunately the available statistics left much to be desired.¹

The Statesman's Yearbook for 1915 gives the population of the province of Aidin or Smyrna as 2,500,000, and that of the city of Smyrna as 375,000, but does not subdivide it into nationalities. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911) gives the population of the city as 250,000 and states that the population was "fully one-half Greek."²

¹Annie C. Marshall makes a point that statistical figures are uncertain because the last census was taken by counting horses and then multiplying by five; Marshall, "Impressions of Smyrna in War-Time", p. 328.

²As cited by Z.D. Ferriman, "Greece-and Tomorrow" (New York: American-Hellenic Society, 1918) Publication No. 2., p. 16; Ferriman, in the above mentioned work, p. 17 notes that M. Bonaventure F. Slaars in his Etude sur Smyrne (1868) computed the Greek population at 75,000 and that of the Turks as 40,000.

The Peace Conference regarded official Turkish statistics after 1912 as unreliable in light of the massacres and forced emigrations after the Second Balkan War and during the Great War.³ The British War Office General Staff's memorandum, "Notes on Greek War Aims", dated January 16, 1919 states that:

Since 1914 the numbers and cohesion of the Greeks in Asia Minor have been seriously diminished by the deliberate policy of the Turco-German authorities. Some 300,000 Greeks were expelled from the littoral in June, 1914, and about 450,000 more from March, 1915, onwards. However, the return of Greek inhabitants to these traditional homes of Hellenism is certain, and the Greek birth-rate is considerably higher than the Turkish.⁴

It is to be noted that during the World War 700,000 Armenians and 300,000 Greeks of Anatolia were exterminated.⁵

Venizelos in discussing the population statistics of Asia Minor did not claim infallibility. He however pointed out that no reliable official statistics had ever been issued. Each nationality from time to time issued population statistics which differed markedly. Venizelos

³Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, VI, p. 39.

⁴Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 797.

⁵Ibid., p. 800; Miller, Diary, XIV, pp. 23-4; Venizelos, "Greece Before the Peace Conference".

explained that the figures that he was about to cite had been obtained from the Greek Patriarchate. He said that he believed that the statistics supplied by the Greek ecclesiastical authorities originated from official Turkish statistics. The total Greek population in Asia Minor was estimated as 1,700,000. Venizelos noted that this estimate correlated with that of Dietrich who in a pamphlet of 1915 established the Greek population as numbering 1,600,000. Dietrich's census it is to be noted was taken after the persecutions of 1915. Venizelos indicated that geography texts used in Turkish high schools estimated the Greek population as 1,300,000 and that the difference could be accounted as a deliberate underestimation.⁶

In western Asia Minor Venizelos claimed the vilayets of Aidin and Brusa and the independent sandjaks of the Dardanelles and Ismid had a Greek population of 1,081,000. Venizelos added to this last figure the population of the adjoining islands between Kastellorizon and Mytilini because he considered the islands economically tied to the mainland. The number of Greeks dwelling in the western portion of Asia Minor was thus established to be 1,480,000. Venizelos excluded 319,000 Greeks of Constantinople and thus claimed

⁶Miller, Diary, XIV, pp. 202-204; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 870-02.

1,132,000 Greeks in the area claimed as compared to 943,000 Moslems. The Greek population had a majority of 189,000. Venizelos pointed out that the Turkish minority could further be further reduced by adding 100,000 Jews, Armenians, and other Christians to the Greek population. The number of non-Moslems to Moslems was in this case 1,250,000 to 943,000 respectively.

In response to doubts which arose concerning the population statistics, Venizelos wrote to the President of the Council on March 8, 1919. Venizelos in his letter to Clemenceau stated that the statistics prepared by the Greek Delegation did not differ markedly from: (1) the annual Statistical Bulletin of the Minister of Finance of the Ottoman Empire, 1326th year (1910), p.2; and (2) the Gotha Almanac of 1914, p. 1187. Both these sources named established the total population on the vilayet of Aidin at 1,702,911. The Greek Delegation claimed 1,659,529 and Venizelos pointed out that the difference of 43,000 was small.⁷

The vilayet of Aidin was generally referred to as the province of Smyrna because of the sandjak of Smyrna had almost as large a population as the four other sandjaks

⁷Miller, Diary, XVII, pp. 335-37.

combined. The sandjak of Smyrna was administratively divided into twelve kazas of which Smyrna was the largest. Statistics of the population divided according to nationalities in the vilayet of Aidin based upon figures available in 1912 is provided as a document in the appendix. This statistical table is the most comprehensive that the present writer has discovered in his research. It is based, according to its anonymous author on the Greek Patriarchate Statistics of 1912.⁸

Alexander Pallis in an appendix of his study provides a statistical table which correlates with that provided by the author who used the pseudonym of Polybius. Pallis notes that his statistics are taken from Maccas, L'Hellenisme de l'Asie Mineure, pp. 78-9, who in turn based his figures on the Turkish Census of 1912. Venizelos used these figures in his memorandum to the Peace Conference of December 30, 1918.⁹

Pallis' table shows the population of the Smyrna enclave as ceded to Greece by the Treaty of Sevres. Greece was ceded the whole sandjak of Smyrna, the kaza of Aivali

⁸Polybius, pseud. "Greece Before the Conference" (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1919), p. 44. (See Appendix C).

⁹Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 227. (see Appendix D).

in the sadnjak of Balikesir, and the kazas of Manisa, Akhisar and Kasaba in the sandjak of Manisa. The Greeks outnumbered the Turks 449,044 to 219,494 in the sandjak of Smyrna. The Greeks constituted a majority in all but three of the twelve kazas of Smyrna. Of the sixteen kazas assigned to Greece by the Treaty of Sevres the Greeks outnumbered the Turks 549,776 to 298,883 and constituted a majority in eleven kazas.¹⁰ It is to be recalled that Venizelos claimed a more extensive area than inhabited by a Greek majority because he considered the area to be a geographical and historical unit as well as for strategic reasons.

Mark Sykes in his book The Caliphs' Last Heritage (London, Macmillan and Company 1915) noted that the Moslems werw "too few in number to raise a successful riot in Smyrna."¹¹ Henry Morgenthau, in Secrets of the Bosphorus, maintains that more than half of the population of Smyrna was Greek and because of this was derisively referred to by the Turks as "giaour Ismir" - "infidel Smyrna."¹²

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹As cited by Mears, ed. Modern Turkey, p. 49.

¹²As cited by Sir Arthur H. Crosfield, "The Settlement of the Near East" (London: The Anglo-Hellenic League, 1922) Pamphlet No. 45., p. 30.

The British War Office General Staff memorandum entitled "Notes on the Greek War Aims" claimed that 600,000 Greeks inhabited the vilayet of Aidin and that "Smyrna itself and its neighborhood were indubitably Greek in 1912."¹³

Editorials of the New York Times in 1919 supported the Greek claims to Smyrna and a considerable area on the west coast of Asia Minor primarily because the Greeks were recognized as constituting a majority of the population in the area claimed. The editors recognized that the Greeks were increasing due to a higher birth rate. Smyrna regarded by the editors as "indisputably Greek." According to statistics available to the editors, in the sandjak of Smyrna there were 450,000 Greeks which was more than double the number of Turks.¹⁴

¹³Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 797.

¹⁴The Times (New York) January 18, 1919, p. 10; H. C. Woods, in his article "Sevres Before and After," Fortnightly Review, (October, 1922), p. 637, maintained a Greek majority in the city of Smyrna and in the sandjak of which it was the center; John F. Carter, Jr. in his article "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece," The Unpartizan Review, October, 1920, p. 309 although admitting a local Greek majority in the city, maintained that a considerable Moslem majority populated the whole province and city of Smyrna.

The following is a table reproduced from A History of the Peace Conference of Paris edited by H. W. V. Temperley. Arnold J. Toynbee was the author of the sections dealing with Near Eastern affairs. Toynbee brings our attention to the fact that the accuracy of the Greek figures of 1912 cannot be seriously questioned.

SMYRNA

Greek Zone as defined in Sevres Treaty

	<u>GREEKS</u>	<u>TURKS</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Greek figures (1912)	553,500	310,000	91,000	954,000
Turkish figures (1914)	300,000	540,000	44,000	894,000
American Dr. Magie (1914)	509,000	470,000	78,000	1,057,000

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In a footnote on page 26 Toynbee quotes American figures which number the Greek inhabitants of the Smyrna sandjak at 375,000, the Moslems at 325,000, and all others at 8,000.¹⁶ Although Toynbee pointed out that the accuracy of the Greek figures could not be seriously questioned, he later claimed that the statistics available at the time of the drafting of

¹⁵Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, VI, p. 39.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 26; Toynbee indicates that this different set of statistics was obtained from House and Seymour's What Really Happened at Paris pp. 194-95 and R.S. Baker's Wilson and World Settlement, II, pp. 192-95.

of the Treaty of Sevres were "estimates only." He points out that the Allies admitted such at the London Conference (February-March, 1921) when it was decided to send a census commission to Smyrna.¹⁷ The statistics of the census commission of 1921, it is to be noted, are not quoted. Toynbee does not mention the probability that by questioning the statistics and regarding them as "estimates only" the Great Powers were trying to discredit Greece's national claim to Smyrna. By that time Great Britain and France were groping for an excuse for not supporting Greece, whose soldiers were committed in Anatolia. By March, 1921 the Turkish Nationalist forces presented themselves as a formidable force to be reckoned with. The Allies of Greece who did not want to become militarily involved were disposed to a revision of the Treaty of Sevres and for coming to an agreement with the Kemalists to secure and protect their own interests.

Toynbee states that: "The decision of the Peace Conference to send Greek troops to Smyrna did not arise from

¹⁷Ibid., p. 44; Arnold J. Toynbee The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London: Constable, 1922), p. 133.

considerations of nationality."¹⁸ From what has been written concerning the decision for occupation this writer is of a contrary opinion. Lloyd George supported the Greek claim because he believed that the Greek population constituted an evident majority in Smyrna and the southwest vilayets of Asia Minor.¹⁹ President Wilson, according to Baker, was persuaded of the equity of the Greek claim to Smyrna because he recognized "that Smyrna was largely a Greek city."²⁰ If the Greeks did not have a national claim why was it decided to send Greek troops to forestall the Italians? Although the statistics which supported the Greek case admittedly were not exact they were the best available at the time. Inconsistencies of statistics do not invalidate the equity of the Greek claim which had a sound basis in an extensive Greek population.

¹⁸ Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 133.

¹⁹ Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, pp. 795, 842.

²⁰ Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p. 191.

VII

THE GREEK LANDING

On May 14 Admiral Calthorpe entered Smyrna harbor with an Allied naval squadron from Constantinople. Allied control officers ashore ordered the disarming of the Turkish garrison and its confinement to the barracks. At 6:30 P.M. Admiral Calthorpe announced the Allied occupation of the city the next day. The announced reason for the landing was that Turkish irregular troops and civilians were being unruly and endangering Greek and other minorities. It was rumored that the Allied troops were to be Greeks. When the Turkish authorities inquired again asking what the phrase meant they were assured that it was to be an Allied occupation with Greek troops. Clair Price noted: "But the rumor persisted and as night drew on, the population of the Turkish quarter withdrew to a hill-top behind the town in an all-night protest meeting."¹

Damad Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had sent emissaries to Smyrna advising resignation and giving assurance that the

¹Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 149; House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 195; Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, p. 558; Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, pp. 138-39.

Greek occupation would be only temporary. He resigned in protest against the occupation of Smyrna and resumed his office the same day.²

Critics of the Greek landing assert that the Turkish authorities in Constantinople and Smyrna had not been sufficiently forewarned by the Allies as to the attitude they should assume and therefore were taken by surprise by what they considered a violation of the Armistice terms.³ It is to be recalled that it had been decided by the Supreme Council to give twelve hours of advance notice. The notice was to be issued locally as well as in Constantinople so as to make sure that the Turkish authorities were informed. General Milne, who commanded the interallied troops at Constantinople, gave the necessary orders and fixed the terms and the limits of the occupation.⁴

Greece, after having received a mandate from the Supreme Council to administer the city of Smyrna, landed troops on

² Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 392; Sforza, Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles, p. 55; Idem, Makers of Modern Europe, p. 359.

³ Carter, "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece", p. 311.

⁴ Edouard Driault et Michel Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de 1821 a nos jours, Tome V, La Grece et la grande guerre de la revolution turque au traite de Lausanne, 1908-1923 (Paris: Les presses universitaires de France, 1925), p. 367. (Hereinafter cited as La Grece et la grande guerre).

May 15 in cooperation with other Allied forces.⁵ Ten thousand Greek troops effected a landing with the support of British, French and American warships.⁶ The Greek naval force included one battleship and five gunboats. Five large Italian warships were also present. The presence of the Italian squadron at Smyrna and the recent landings of Italian troops at Adalia indicated that Italy apparently sought to safeguard her interests in Asia Minor.⁷

According to Clair Price, the Ottoman garrison was withdrawn to their barracks by 7 A.M. By 10 P.M. British marines disembarked onto the quay and took possession of the telegraph offices. The Greek troops followed landing from transports.⁸ The Greek military, according to Carter, had been advised by the Supreme Council that the occupation should be unostentatious so as to avoid arousing racial clashes. The

⁵The Times (New York) May 17, 1919, p. 5.

⁶According to Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 388, twenty thousand Greek troops were landed; Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, p. 266, records that 15,000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna and other coastal areas between May 15-22.

⁷Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 234; The Times (New York) May 17, 1919, p. 5.

⁸Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, p. 139.

enthusiasm of the local population could not be constrained. The indigenous Greek population regarded this as the day of their salvation from the tyranny of the Turks. Bands played and flags waved as Greek troops marched down the quay.⁹ The Metropolitan on behalf of the large and enthusiastic crowd welcomed the Greek troops. As the troops advanced towards the city towards the konak of the vali the Greek population cheered "Zito Venizelos". According to Driault and Lheretier the shooting of guns started at the corner of the square of the konak. The Greek troops overreacted and answered with a furious fusillade. In the overexcitement and confusion there was much violence. More than 2,000 Turks were arrested, including the vali. They were brought aboard the Patris and forced by the crowd and the soldiers to cry "Zito Venizelos". Among the Greeks two soldiers were killed, six wounded, twenty civilians killed, twenty drowned, and sixty wounded. Turkish victims numbered three to four

⁹Carter, "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece", p. 311; According to Alastos, Venizelos, p. 192 preparations were carried out in such secrecy that the Greek troops knew nothing of the decision until they arrived in Smyrna harbor on May 14.

hundred, with as many killed as wounded.¹⁰

Clair Price's account although mentioning that there was much confusion does not mention any shooting until The Greek troops fired upon the barracks with machine guns.¹¹ According to Carter, the Greek troops were fired upon when they attempted to seize the barracks. The Turkish troops which had not yet been disarmed were supposedly taken by surprise by what they considered a violation of the Armistice terms.¹²

The Greek military and civilians, it was claimed, over-reacted and massacred Moslems. According to Mears, the Greeks after landing attacked all wearers of the fez, which according

¹⁰ Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, p. 369; House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 469 note that the Allied Commission of Inquiry could not establish which side fired the first shot; Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, p. 50 quotes Sir Mark Sykes who in his book The Caliphs' Last Heritage, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1915) refers to "revolver mania" and notes that in Smyrna revolvers were "discharged only on feast days of the Greek Church, or about twice a week"; Count Carlo Sforza who at the time was the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople, stated that informers assured him that a Greek agent provocateur fired the first shot which resulted in a massacre; Sforza, Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles, p. 55; Idem, Makers of Modern Europe. p. 360.

¹¹ Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, p. 139; Price, *ibid.*, notes that the killing continued for days.

¹² Carter, "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece", p. 311.

to him is an "indication of nationality rather than race" and thus the Greeks killed their racial kinsmen.¹³

Armstrong in what is obviously a biased and exaggerated account wrote that the Greeks:

Began to massacre as soon as they landed. The officers and men of the British battleship moored close to the quay were ordered to remain inactive, while, within a few yards of their stern, Greek troops committed murder and foul brutalities. It is said that so difficult was it to prevent the British sailors from interfering that they were all ordered below decks.¹⁴

Allied military authorities aboard the warships in Smyrna harbor were most certainly aware of the situation yet did not take any action. House and Seymour state that the massacre was witnessed by hundreds of Europeans and Americans aboard the Allied and American ships.¹⁵

The facts were hidden by the Greek military from Venizelos and the true nature of the vents did not become known until later.

¹³Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, p. 567.

¹⁴Harold Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 83.

¹⁵Carter, "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece", p. 311; Edib, Turkey Faces West, p. 150; House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 468.

The Greek military authorities in a telegram to Venizelos on May 15 rejected the entire responsibility for any incidents blaming the Turks. Nothing was mentioned of Greek misconduct whatever or of the massacre of prisoners.¹⁶

An Associated Press dispatch from Constantinople on May 16 reported "hard fighting" after the landing of the Greek troops. Eight hundred Turks and one hundred Greeks were reportedly killed. This account noted that the fighting for the most part occurred in the Turkish quarter of the city "when the Greeks were met by lively rifle fire".¹⁷

Halide Edib's memoirs notes that there always existed in the mountains of Smyrna semi-political bands which were in conflict with the Ottoman government. Their activities included kidnapping children of the rich and holding them for ransom, and the killing of government officials and gendarmes. Edib makes mention:

¹⁶Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, p. 262.

¹⁷The Times (New York) April 19, 1919, p. 17.

In the early days of the Greek invasion, not having seen the manner of the occupation, they came down from the mountains and had joined the Greeks. This was partly due to a desire to loot, and partly to their hatred of the Ottoman government. But before a month had passed, they had taken their arms and marched back again. Keukje Effe was one of the first to lead his band against the Greeks. His story has turned into a sort of legend.¹⁸

Unfortunately Edib's account does not inform the reader how many people the Turkish irregulars had murdered and robbed, or how many homes they had pillaged.

It is difficult to determine the number of Turks massacred. It is indisputable that the Turks were armed and resisted. It is generally agreed that the Greek military and civilians overreacted and in fact massacred Moslems. Oftentimes, in statistics cited, the distinction between those who were killed in armed opposition and those who might have been massacred is not made. Varying statistics in addition may in part be accounted for by the fact that some figures represent totals of varying number of incidents in what is often an unspecified period of time and in an unspecified area.

¹⁸Edib, Turkish Ordeal, p. 61; Halide Edib who was in Constantinople at the time provided a lurid and gruesome account which was typical of Turkish propaganda. Her detailed account of the Greek landing is included as Appendix E.

Turkish figures claimed that 20,000 were killed, while the Greeks declared that 200 in all were killed which included Moslem and Greek casualties.¹⁹ Mavrogordato, in describing what apparently was the first incident, states that 20 Turks were shot down in the streets.²⁰ According to House and Seymour, Greek troops and civilians on May 15 and 16 massacred between 400 to 800 Turks in the city and environs. House and Seymour hazard an estimate that by the end of the month over 2,000 Turks were massacred as a result of the Greek landing.²¹

On May 21, the New York Times on the basis of a May 20th report from Paris noted that Allied casualties numbered 300 and that Turkish soldiers stubbornly defended the forts which guarded the city. British, French, and Italian forces were said to have captured the forts and other strategic points while the Greeks occupied the center of the city proper. According to this report the city was tranquil and the Greek ecclesiastics urged just treatment of the Moslem inhabitants. An American Consular guard was landed by orders of Rear Admiral Bristol to guard the United States Consulate and American

¹⁹Carter, "Hellenism and the Fringes of New Greece", p. 311.

²⁰John Mavrogordato Modern Greece (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1931), p. 123.

²¹House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 195.

citizens. The American force took no part in the operations against the Turks.²²

House and Seymour considered Venizelos only remotely responsible and they accused the Greek military officers under his direction as being directly responsible.²³ They however ignore the responsibility of the Allies. Although technically it was an inter-Allied occupation, the Allied commanders with their landing parties refused to intervene.

An American educator who witnessed the disturbances subsequent to the Greek landing was moved to write a letter to the New York Times critical of Greek conduct. It is significant that the author of this letter does not accuse the Greek military as being responsible. Noting that there were disturbances everywhere accompanied by looting which continued in Smyrna and outlying villages for a day or two, the letter ends stating that the Greek troops made efforts to stop the pillaging and restore some goods.²⁴

²²The Times (New York), May 21, 1919, p. 6.

²³House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 195.

²⁴The Times (New York) August 19, 1919, p. 18.

Colonel Zaphiriou commander of the Greek troops, issued a proclamation on May 16 declaring that the occupation "was made by Greece in concert with her Allies in order to guarantee the security of the population" and that the occupation was made without anticipating the decision of the Supreme Council. It was understood that British and French forces would be withdrawn as soon as the authority of Greece as mandatory was firmly established.²⁵

At the May 19 meeting of the Supreme Council Sonnino remarked that he was informed that there had been disorder and that the Greeks went to Aidin. Venizelos said that he did not have any information concerning disturbances. The original disturbance at Smyrna, according to Venizelos, had been partly due to the strike of Turkish officials, and partly to the opening of the prisons, after which there had been some looting. Venizelos said that he had not ordered any troops to Aidin but had no information if troops had gone. Venizelos explained that in his general orders he had ordered the Greek Commanding Officer to send troops wherever it was necessary for the occupation of localities where disorders occurred. Venizelos related

²⁵The Times (New York) May 18, 1919, p. 6.

that he had ordered two more regiments and five hundred gendarmes sent to Smyrna because of the strike and because there were no organized forces there to keep order.²⁶

Lloyd George at the Supreme Council meeting the following day read a telegram from the British G.H.Q., Constantinople dated May 17. The telegram related that the Greeks on landing had been fired on by Turkish gendarmes and that firing continued all day. The Greeks attacked and killed Turkish soldiers whenever they were seen. It alleged that the wounded were killed and thrown into the sea and that the Greek Officers made no attempt to restrain their men. Sir Maurice Hankey, Lloyd George's Secretary, was instructed to bring this to Venizelos' attention.²⁷

Venizelos, as previously mentioned, had the true circumstances hidden from him by Colonel Zaphiriou. The report of the Greek commander mentioned only armed conflict and limited Greek responsibility to "a few acts of pillage" with the guilty punished in an exemplary way. For the acts of disorder which occurred on May 15 seventy-four persons were arrested and judged that day. Of these fifteen were condemned to death, four to

²⁶U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 716-21; Mysteriously on the eve of the Greek landing prisoners in the Smyrna jail were allowed to escape; Frangulis, La Grece et la crise modiale, II, pp. 64-7.

²⁷U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 733.

hard labor for life, two to hard labor for a number of years, and fifty-three sent to prison. Of those sentenced forty-eight were Greek, thirteen Turkish, twelve Armenian, and one Jew. Venizelos was not fully appraised until he ordered an inquiry on the spot and received Colonel Mazarakis' report in July. At the time Venizelos received the report in July ten more accused were in jail awaiting trial. The Greek commanding officer, Colonel Zaphiriou was latter held responsible for the incidents and the reprisals and released of his command. Two other Greek officers in addition were punished.²⁸

Colonel Mazarakis' report of 15/28 July confirmed that Turkish soldiers as well as civilians and unarmed prisoners, had suffered violence mostly on the first and second day. Available information regarding the causes of the conflict, he noted, was contradictory because everyone tried to put the responsibility on someone else. Mazarakis believed that some Turkish fanatics fired first on the army. The enraged Greek mob lynched fifteen to twenty Turkish prisoners on the wharf.²⁹

²⁸Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, pp. 261-64.

²⁹Ibid., p. 262.

The Turkish Government in its protest to the Peace Conference against the landing of Italian forces at Sokia on May 26 expressed regret that the Greeks had been permitted to occupy Smyrna, noting that it would have been more prudent to have had a joint allied occupation. This mild protest predicted trouble as the Greeks advanced into the interior.³⁰ Immediately following this protest on May 27, Italian troops re-embarked, turning control over to the Turkish military authorities.³¹

As Associated Press release of May 29 from Paris reported that the Greek Government sent a High Commissioner to take charge of affairs in Smyrna. The Turkish Government apparently in response called a meeting of the Great General Council. Although, the populace of Constantinople was reported to be apprehensive, there were no disturbances.³²

By the end of May, Greek troops had advanced against the Turks toward Manisa and Aidin. These areas were thirty miles northeast of Smyrna and eighty miles to the southeast

³⁰ The Times (New York) May 27, 1919, p. 3.

³¹ The Times (New York) May 28, 1919, p. 5.

³² The Times (New York) May 30, 1919, p. 2.

respectively. An official statement by the Greek Government declared that the purpose of the advance was to restore order and to take a census.³³ A Greek force landed at Aivali, on the coast of Asia Minor six miles northwest of Smyrna and gained control of the city after overcoming slight Turkish resistance.³⁴

On June 2, the Greek General Headquarters at Salonika stated that the stories of disorders and pillage were exaggerated and that there had been no disorders in Smyrna since May 16. The Greek occupation, the statement continues, was welcomed not only by the Greeks but also the Moslem population. It is claimed that during the fighting with Turkish troops incident to the Greek landing two Greek soldiers were killed and eight wounded. The total of civilian casualties is stated to be one hundred and fifty.³⁵

House and Seymour mention that early in July Venizelos had been warned by the Supreme Council that the Greek troops were advancing beyond the limits set. Venizelos offered an explanation and promises, however within forty-eight hours sent a telegram ordering a still further advance.³⁶

³³The Times (New York) May 29, 1919, p. 3.

³⁴The Times (New York) May 31, 1919, p. 8.

³⁵The Times (New York) June 4, 1919, p. 23.

³⁶House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 195.

They fail to mention whether or not the further advance was authorized by the limits set by the Supreme Council.

Venizelos appeared before the Council of Five on July 16 to explain the disturbances incident to the Greek landing. He suggested "that insults to French troops marching into Strasburg might have provoked similar measures of retaliation."³⁷

The Supreme Council on the afternoon of July 16 continued to delimit the areas which the Greeks and the Italians would be permitted to occupy in southern Asia Minor. Venizelos informed the council that Greece had committed 65,000 troops and stated that this was too many and expressed a willingness to withdraw some of them. A tentative boundary was agreed between the Greek and Italian forces which was subject to the approval of the Council. The assertion that the Italians were encouraging the Turks was declared to be without foundation.³⁸

³⁷Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, VI, p. 26.

³⁸The Times (New York) July 17, 1919, p. 1.

The Supreme Council decided on July 18 that General E.H.H. Allenby of the British Army should take charge of the occupation of Asia Minor. Allenby's supervision of the British, French, Italian, and Greek troops would stabilize conditions in Smyrna and other parts of Asia Minor, and would prevent clashes between Greek and Italian troops.³⁹ It was further agreed that the zones of occupation "have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference."⁴⁰

Agreement was finally concluded between Premier Venizelos and Tomasso Tittoni, the Foreign Minister of Italy, concerning areas of conflicting interests. The Italian Government agreed to support Greek claims in Eastern and Western Thrace, Northern Epirus, and in Asia Minor. Greek claims to the sandjaks of Denizli, Mentese and Aidin were withdrawn limiting Greek claims to the sandjak of Smyrna. If Greece's claims in Asia Minor were met, the Greek Government agreed to renounce claims to area south of Smyrna in favor of Italy. Greece agreed to lease to the Italians for fifty years a free zone in the port of Smyrna as a commercial privilege. This agreement known as the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement was presented to and endorsed by the Supreme Council on July 18.⁴¹

³⁹The Times (New York) July 19, 1919, p. 3.

⁴⁰Miller, Diary, XIX, p. 569.

⁴¹Albrecht Carrie, Italy at the Peace Conference, pp. 242-43; Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, pp. 37-8, 100-01; Miller, Diary, XIX, p. 569; The Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement was officially repudiated by the Giolitti Government in July, 1920.

VIII

TURKISH PROTEST AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Turkish displeasure with the Supreme Council's decision authorizing the Greek landing became apparent immediately. The rumor that it was to be a Greek occupation resulted on May 14 in an all-night protest meeting on a hilltop behind the town of Smyrna.¹

Protest demonstrations and resistance was organized in Constantinople by Raouf Bey and others. Student unions in Constantinople organized protests against the massacres reported to have taken place and all student organizations participated. At a mass rally at the Municipal building or Hippodrome in the capital on May 20, Halide Edib made a fierce appeal to Turkish nationalism. Demonstrators carried black banners and wore armlets of black with the legend in red letters that read: "Smyrna shall remain Turk." This meeting, according to Armstrong, "concluded with a few words of encouragement from French officers who were on the platform." French officers spoke at other public meetings against the Greek

¹Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, p. 139.

landing and encouraged Turkish resistance.² Major Labonne, the French representative at Afion-Kara-Hissar, Colonel Mongin at Angora, and General Bathelemy, the French Military Attache in Constantinople openly sided with the Turkish cause.

Cannellopoulos, the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople, noted in a dispatch to Paris on May 22 that the excitement caused by the Greek occupation of Smyrna increased following the publication of news concerning the definitive dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Meetings were held, the press was full of menaces, churches closed and stores closed in a sign of mourning. Canellopoulos was of the opinion that the Turkish government was creating an atmosphere of agitation in an attempt to convince the Supreme Council to reverse their decision.³

Halide Edib records that "the Meeting" was held at Sultan Ahmed on June 6. A very large black flag inscribed in huge white letters "Wilson's Twelfth Point" dominated the crowd which was estimated by staff officers to number 200,000.⁴

²Edib, Turkish Ordeal, p. 30; Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, pp. 86, 92-3; The Times (London) May 29, 1919, p. 11.

³Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, p. 259.

⁴Edib, Turkish Ordeal, p. 30.

The Turks considered the landing a violation of the Armistice terms. Turkish opinion held that there had not been any pretext for putting Article 7 of the Armistice into effect, especially because no previous local disorders had been proved. Edib notes that the Turks respected the Armistice terms until the Allies violated it with the landing. The Turkish Delegation at the Peace Conference sent a memorandum on June 19 to the Supreme Council pointing out that the landing was incompatible with the Armistice.⁵

The Turkish Delegation on June 23 sent another memorandum and informed Clemenceau that the Ottoman people "will not accept the dismemberment of the Empire or its division under different mandates."⁶

Indignation was such that inter-Allied censorship judged it appropriate to allow the press free expression. Newspapers protested and pictured the Turkish people as a nation in mourning. Simultaneously all the papers in Constantinople published in black headlines Wilson's Twelfth Point.⁷

⁵Edib, Turkey Faces West, p. 160; Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, p. 141; Miller, Diary, XVIII, p. 515.

⁶U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, VI, p. 694.

⁷Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, pp. 468-9.

A typical presentation of the Turkish view as expressed in the Constantinople Wakit follows:

We have been aware of the long-cherished desire of the Greeks to possess Smyrna. We have noted not without disquietude the strong influence of Venizelos in the Peace Conference. But we are astounded that when the whole question of Turkey's future is still undecided, still pending, a decision of such grave importance to the Ottoman state should be hurriedly put into execution before the justice of it could possibly be impartially studied. Have conquered peoples no rights to be respected by their conquerors?...It is inevitable that the Greek occupation of Smyrna will engender endless bitter opposition by this population so unjustly treated.⁸

The Greek occupation of Smyrna acted as a catalyst in the development of the Nationalist Party. Angered Turks joined defense committees which constituted the base of the Nationalist Movement.⁹

Mustapha Kemal was near Samsun when the news of the occupation reached him. Kemal delivered a speech which caused an English officer in the district to telegram Constantinople and demand his immediate recall. However, before the order of recall arrived Kemal set out for Erzerum on an inspection tour.¹⁰ The first nationalist congress

⁸"Loss of Smyrna Angers Turks", Literary Digest July 12, 1919, p. 22.

⁹Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, p. 143.

¹⁰Sforza, Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles, pp. 55-6; Idem, Makers of Modern Europe. p. 360.

was held there in July, 1919 from which the Nationalist Organization emerged with a program of action.¹¹

In September, 1919, the scope of the movement was widened with the Sivas Congress and the promulgation of a declaration stating the general principles upon which became the subsequent National Pact. The declaration of September 13 opposed dismemberment and the Allied occupation. Articles III and IV declared:

III. Against all intermeddling or occupation of no matter what part of the Ottoman territory, and in particular against every movement tending toward the formation, at the expense of the mother country, of an independent Armenia and of an independent Greece on the Aidin, Magnesia, and Balikhisar fronts, we are absolutely resolved to resist and to defend our rights.

V. All methods and all means are taken with a view to safeguard the Sultanate, the supreme Khalifate and the integrity of the country in the case where the Turkish government under foreign pressure should be called upon to abandon no matter what part of our territory.¹²

¹¹Hanns Froembgen, Kemal Atatürk, trans. by Kenneth Kirkness (New York: Hillman-Curl, Inc., 1937), p. 114 ff.

¹²Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, pp. 627-28.

An executive committee was appointed of which Mustapha Kemal was elected president.¹³ According to Edib, it was at this time that most of the political clubs of the Union and Progress movement changed their names and took on a more revolutionary complexion.¹⁴

After the adjournment of the Sivas Congress, the Executive Committee continued to meet and establish permanent headquarters at Angora, chosen for its remote and militarily secure position.¹⁵

A National Assembly meeting at Angora in October accepted the document known as the National Pact which proclaimed the independence and the indivisibility of the people of Anatolia and Turkey. On January 28, 1920 the legal Ottoman Parliament in Turkey's capital also adopted the National Pact.¹⁶ Edib notes that the reaction of British headquarters was "sulky silence," while that of the French and Italian headquarters "somewhat sympathetic". This was indeed to be "decidedly ominous".¹⁷

¹³Froembgen, Kemal Atatürk, p. 126.

¹⁴Edib, Turkey Faces West, p. 155.

¹⁵Froembgen, Kemal Atatürk, p. 137.

¹⁶Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, pp. 560, 629

¹⁷Edib, Turkish Ordeal, p. 62.

The future was indeed decidedly ominous because Allied statesmen in Paris had at first minimized and underestimated the seriousness of the Nationalist Movement. Despite warnings, the advice of the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople and of the General Staffs was not heeded. By the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920 because of the unexpected opposition and mutual jealousies, their original plans for the partition of Turkey were altered as well as their original commitment to Greece.

IX

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ANATOLIAN WAR

The first year of the military campaign of the Anatolian War in 1919 is significant because Turkish opposition to Allied plans for the dismemberment of the Turkish state had been made evident. It is also indicative that the terms of the Armistice of Mudros had not been carried out. Disarmament should have proceeded at a faster pace. The policies of the different Allied Governments, though never united, began to diverge significantly in 1919.

A serious question arises of whether the Allies deliberately underestimated the reality of the situation so as to avoid having to fulfill commitments to Greece. Admittedly the post war era was characterized by war weariness and financial difficulty. However these problems did not mitigate against making sacrifices and supporting the just claims of Greece in western Asia Minor. Though it was evident that the Anatolian War was severely straining the Greek economy and exhausting the army, sufficient monies in the form of loans was lacking. The Allied Governments did not offer military reinforcements which most certainly would have been appreciated. The League of Nations failed at the time of inception to take any action to support the just claims of Greece.

Halide Edib writes that: "From the day of the occupation of Smyrna, the western Anatolians started their own defense and became exponents of the Turkish Nationalist movement".¹ 20,000 Turkish troops which had been authorized to remain at Sivas and Erzerum for gendarmerie purposes became the nucleus of formidable opposition. Rifles, breech-blocks, and munitions were no longer handed in. Reservists were called up instead of being disbanded. Munitions from the eastern provinces had not yet been surrendered. The Turks also had available munitions from old Russian depots of the Russian advance of 1915-16. The necessary arms were smuggled into Turkey from friendly Bolshevik Russia. Although the Allies dismantled artillery which they left in Turkish possession, these needed only new breech-blocks and range-finders.²

There had always been semipolitical bands in the mountains of Smyrna. Edib notes that these bands wished to loot and they had joined the Greeks at first but after a month had returned to the mountains from which they could harass the Greeks. Keukje Effe was one first to lead his band against the Greeks. The resistance movement centered about the towns of Aidin and Nazili.

¹Edib, Turkey Faces West, p. 170.

²Price, The Rebirth of Turkey, p. 144. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 153.

This Turkish authoress admits that the resistance movement received some behind the scene technical help from regular officers. Ali Fuad Pasha in Central Anatolia organized a defense force with the nucleus of an irregular army, which Edib denies had any connection with the regular forces under his command.³

The Supreme Council agreed on May 19, 1919 that in the event of disorders in the vilayet of Aidin, Greek troops could be sent to restore order after having obtained the approval of the Senior Naval Officer of the Allied Fleets at Smyrna. This officer was to be the final judge as to whether circumstances justified the dispatch of troops. The Supreme Council further agreed that Greek troops might be sent without specific authorization to districts within the sandjak of Smyrna, but not south of Ayasoluk and within the kaza of Aivali for the purpose of establishing order and for the protection of returning refugees. Venizelos requested this authorization for the safety of the large number of refugees from Turkey. Venizelos wanted to resettle the refugees who were residing in Greece and the neighboring islands in time for the sowing season.⁴

³Edib, Turkey Faces West, p. 157; Idem, Turkish Ordeal, p. 61.

⁴U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, V. pp. 722-23.

On May 20 Venizelos sent a telegram from Paris which precisely stated the conditions and the extent of Greek occupation. M. Sterghiades named High Commissioner arrived from Epirus passing through Athens. According to Driault and Lheretier he seems to have arbitrarily to have exceeded the instructions of his government. Without consulting the Allied representatives M. Sterghiades made Greek troops occupy Aidin and Manisa.⁵ Toynbee notes, however, that the Supreme Council sanctioned the Greek occupation without defining the area and for this reason "naturally" occupied as much as possible "up to the railways leading to Aidin and Manisa".⁶

Halide Edib writes that: "Somehow neither the presence of the Allied armies in Constantinople nor the sorry state of Turkish politics prevented a great number of Turkish youths from going to the Smyrna mountains..."⁷

Meanwhile, bands of Turks formed in the neighborhood of Aidin. The Greeks were forced to evacuate Aidin on the night of May 29-30, after which the Turks burned all of the Greek quarter. 1,500-2,000 Greeks and 1,200-1,500 Turks were killed

⁵Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, pp. 369-70.

⁶Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 226.

⁷Edib, Turkish Ordeal, p. 25.

in the fighting.⁸ According to Toynbee the temporary recapture of the town of Aidin was the work of Turkish chettes made possible by the too rapid advance of the Greek army.⁹ An official announcement from Smyrna stated that Aidin was attacked by Turkish forces numbering 5,000 men. The town was bombarded by heavy artillery. Turks of Ahmedli (five miles from Kasaba) who were refugees in Kasaba (twenty five miles east of Smyrna) dispatched a deputation to the commander of the first Greek division asking him to occupy their town and thus save it from pillage by Turkish irregulars. A written petition to this effect was presented to the Greek commander.¹⁰

Italian hostility to Greek aspirations became more evident as both countries expanded their respective areas of military occupation and as they met as rivals. On June 2, 1919 their troops opened fire on each other at the village of Cherkes Keuy.¹¹

Bergama was occupied on the twelfth of June and taken by the Turks on the sixteenth. On June 17 at Menemen, fourteen

⁸ Drault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, p. 369.

⁹ Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 226; Turkish chettes from behind a screen of Italian troops at Scala Nuova, Sokia, and on the south bank of the Meander raided Greek occupied territory. Toynbee states that Greek troops were prevented from retaliating by Italian troops; *ibid.*

¹⁰ The Times (London) July 3, 1919, p. 17.

¹¹ Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 90.

miles west of Smyrna, Greek troops panicked and attacked the Turkish population. In a short time 200 Turks were killed and as many wounded.¹²

Nazili (thirty miles east of Aidin) was held for a considerable time by Turkish Nationalist forces commanded by Mehmed Effe, more popularly known as Demirdji.¹³ After the Turkish occupation of Bergama the Greeks suddenly evacuated Nazili on June 19 which thus exposed it to plundering by wandering bands of robbers the following day. The pillage was ended with the arrival of Turkish troops on June 21.¹⁴

Lord Curzon's letter of June 20 to Balfour expressed his concern regarding the advance of Italian and Greek troops. He was further disturbed by reports of the British High Commissioner at Constantinople. In Lord Curzon's opinion the situation would result in "protracted violence and disorder".¹⁵

Following the conflict in the town of Menemen the Greek population pillaged Turkish property. Although the Greek military

¹²Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, pp. 369-70.

¹³Edib, Turkish Ordeal, p. 61.

¹⁴The Times (London) July 18, 1919, p. 13.

¹⁵Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, p. 267.

punished the pillagers such incidents resulted in unfavorable publicity for the Greek cause. Politis requested Canellopoulos in a telegram of June 23 to ask Admiral Calthorpe that British officers be stationed near the Greek G.H.Q. The British officers would be impartial witnesses to establish the truth officially. It was urged that such be done promptly to prevent the formation of slanderous accusations. Canellopoulos answered on June 30 that Admiral Calthorpe favorably accepted the proposal but said that it had to be referred to the British Government for a decision.¹⁶

On June 24, Politis telegraphed Caclamanos the Greek Minister in London requesting that the British Government be asked to send British officers to the Greek troops. It was hoped that the presence of British officers would intimidate the Turks and discourage their attacks. Captain Talbot of the British navy, on behalf of the Greek Government officially asked that the Greek suggestion be accepted. The British Government true to its policy of not wanting to get involved did not follow up the Greek proposal.¹⁷

¹⁶Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, p. 270.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 260.

Ahmedi was occupied by Greek troops on June 27. The Mulfti and the Kaimakam of Saliohli (sixty miles from Smyrna) and many other notables of the town handed the French officer delegate in the town a petition also asking for Greek occupation. They stated in the petition that they are tired of the pillage and the crimes of the Turkish irregulars. The petition was given to the French officer with the request that it be forwarded to the French High Commander.¹⁸

Armstrong noted that the Turks had been emboldened by the fact that they were not made to suffer reprisals and that by the end of June "came out more boldly into the open. Irregular troops with the backing of regulars continually harried the Greeks, and sometimes there were fierce engagements." Erzerum, Konya, and the hills of Smyrna were centers of organized resistance. Armed refugees fled to the hills and were organized into irregular bands that attacked the Greek troops. Armstrong notes that the Christians were at a disadvantage because they had already surrendered their arms at the orders of the Allies. The Turks however had no difficulty in securing arms in quantity and immediately because "the disarmament of the Turkish forces had been neglected by the Allied commanders".¹⁹

¹⁸The Times (London) July 3, 1919, p.17.

¹⁹Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, pp. 85,88.

To the north of the Bergama area Greek reinforcements which had been sent out had several successful encounters with Turkish regulars. On June 29 there was fighting after a Turkish advance from the south in the neighborhood of Aidin. Greek troops evacuated after a three hour battle on June 30. Casualties were estimated at forty killed and eighty wounded. In the attack on Aidin artillery was used and the town set on fire. On the fourth of July, Greek troops returned in force to Aidin from Tire under a formal order of Venizelos. The Greeks avenged the burning of the Greek quarter by burning the entire Turkish quarter. Two-thirds of Aidin lay in ruins. From Aidin Greek troops advanced to Kirova (twenty miles from Smyrna) where Italian troops were met.²⁰

On July 7 three hundred Greeks attacked Turkish positions at Yeni Chillik, twelve miles northeast of Manisa. Twenty Greeks were killed and wounded, while Turkish casualties numbered seventy.²¹

On July 10 Venizelos wrote to Clemenceau warning the President of the Council that Turkish military preparations

²⁰The Times (London) July 3, 1919, p. 17; *ibid.* July 18, 1919, p. 13.

²¹The Times (London) July 18, 1919, p. 13.

were developing in such an ominous way. Venizelos warned of the danger that the war would be restarted in the East and thus make it impossible to control the Eastern Question. He added that the number of men mobilized by the Turks would soon number 300,000 and made reference to Italo-Turkish collusion.²²

A London Times correspondent in Constantinople at the time estimated the number of irregular forces in the Smyrna hinterland numbered 15,000. Recruits were noted to be Circassians and Muhajirs. It was reported that the native Turks in Anatolia were not joining the irregular forces to any extent with the exception of refugees from Smyrna.²³

Greek forces in July occupied Aivali, Bergama, Manisa, Nazili, Kasaba, Odemis, and Aidin west along the railway to the Mediterranean coast. In the fresh fighting that broke out

²²Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, p. 261; Miller in his Diary, XIX, p. 568 noted that the Supreme Council discussed Venizelos' note on July 15.

²³The Times (London) July 16, 1919, p. 11; The Times (London) September 17, 1919, p. 9, noted that recruits included Yuruks, all sorts of adventurers, unemployed Moslems, ex-officers, and some local leaders; Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood in Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 95 mention that it was said that Kemal's recruits were made up of riff-raff of Turkish prisons who were released during the Great War by Tal' at Pasha to exterminate the Armenian and Greek population of the Pontus and the interior of Anatolia.

east of Aidin on July 14 the Turks were forced to retire. Four Greek officers including three captains and thirteen soldiers were killed.²⁴

The semi-official government newspaper in Athens, Hestia, in an article on the situation in Asia Minor, declared that the Greek Army continued its task of establishing order while Turkey was organizing armed resistance. Italy, it is noted, protested against every necessary measure taken by Greek troops. It complained of the attitude of certain circles in Europe who, overlooking Turkish crimes, are apt to misjudge the whole Greek Army on account of "a few peccadilloes by certain soldiers". The article continued:

But Greece is entitled to ask her Allies whether Turkey is bound by the Armistice terms, and if so, why is she allowed a military organization while we are not allowed a free hand in dealing with her, and why foreign deputies have dared to ask whether a few Turks have been killed by Greek troops in self-defense, whereas nobody has risen to ask whether Turkey has signed the Armistice and whether she ought to respect her obligations.²⁵

The Greek Prime Minister's note given to the Supreme Council on July 17 requested that Greek troops be given control

²⁴The Times (London) July 18, 1919, p. 13.

²⁵The Times (London) July 19, 1919, p. 13.

of the railroads lines leading to Smyrna and that the Supreme Council demand according to Article 20 of the Armistice the surrender to the Allied and Associated Powers all the Turkish war material.²⁶

The London Times in reporting a meeting of the Supreme Council of July 18 which dealt with the situation in Asia Minor wrote that it was understood that an Italo-Greek agreement regarding the distribution of forces was reached. The Paris dispatch noted that: "It appears that General Allenby will take over supreme command of all troops in this area, including British, French, Greek, and Italian troops".²⁷

A delayed dispatch of July 30 from the London Times correspondent in Constantinople reported further fighting between Greek troops and Turkish irregulars at Eumirli and Keushk, east of Aidin, and in the Aivali district. The ranks of the Turkish irregulars grew with the refugees who became recruits. Recruiting along the line of the Anatolian Railway, it is mentioned without explanation, had been a comparative failure.²⁸

²⁶Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, p. 266.

²⁷The Times (London) July 19, 1919, p. 13.

²⁸The Times (London) August 5, 1919, p. 10.

General Sir George Milne, commander of the Allied troops in the northern sector of Asia Minor arrived at Smyrna on the evening of August 5 and landed the following morning. He was officially received by General Paraskevopoulos, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces. General Milne was given full authority from the Allied Supreme Council, pending its ultimate decisions, to control all Allied troops in western Asia Minor and to restore order in the Smyrna district. His principle object was a delimitation of the line separating the Allied and Turkish zones.²⁹

The situation in September in the Smyrna hinterland was temporarily tranquil for this was the harvest period. It was reported that the National Organization had been using coercion to recruit the Turkish peasantry. The Rabbi of Brusa complained through the Grand Rabbi to his Government that the Nationalists have been attempting to recruit non-Moslems. The newspaper account explained that if the complaint was justified it was more likely that they wished to extract money rather than semi-military service from the Jews, Greeks, and Armenians.³⁰

²⁹The Times (London) August 9, 1919, p. 10; *ibid.*, August 10, 1919, p. 9; General Sir George Milne B.S.F. was commander of the British Salonika force of the Allied Army of the Middle East.

³⁰The Times (London) September 17, 1919, p. 9.

Although quiet prevailed in the city of Smyrna, the Turks engaged the Greeks in guerilla fighting outside the city limits. Greek forces numbering 80,000 were harassed effectively by approximately 10,000 Turkish irregulars.³¹

Sir Henry Wilson on October 28 commented in his diary concerning a conversation he had with Venizelos:

I told him straight out that he had ruined his country and himself by going to Smyrna; and the poor man agreed, but said that the reason was because Paris had not finished off the Turk and had made peace with him. This, of course, is only partly so. Venizelos is very bitter against the Turk, and said the whole 12 divisions were available if we would finish the Turks off. He realizes that he is in a hopeless position, and is trying now to sell his 12 divisions. He begged me to tell Lloyd George that both he (Venizelos) and Greece were done. I said I would. The old boy is done.³²

Venizelos in November again warned the Supreme Council of the difficulties of the situation. He maintained that Greece could not continue to keep up a huge army to police Smyrna.³³

³¹The Times (New York) September 12, 1919, p. 17; The Times (London) September 17, 1919, p. 9 estimated the number of Turkish irregulars to be 15,000 strong.

³²Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, II, p. 213; Callwell noted that Venizelos' pessimistic view was "somewhat singular" for at the time of the conversation the military situation was settled. Henry Wilson wrote in his diary entry of November 17 that there would be trouble all over the East if the British Foreign Office continued backing Greece, *ibid.*, p. 214.

³³Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 97.

The Supreme Council could not have mistaken the significance of its decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna. Realizing the difficulties of the situation, Clemenceau reserved freedom of action for the Supreme Council by declaring that its decision was:

Only a provisional measure which leaves intact the freedom of the Peace Conference to regulate the different problems presented by the Eastern question while keeping in consideration the general world situation, as much as the wishes and interests of the populations.³⁴

In an interview with a New York Times correspondent, Venizelos refuted the provisional nature of the decision by stating:

When we were asked by President Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George and Clemenceau to occupy Smyrna there was no mention of temporary occupation. If it had been a matter of a mandate for policing a larger nation would have been called upon. We are too small a nation to do any policing of other nations.³⁵

A November 29 dispatch from Salonika reported that Greek forces defeated Turks in fighting over the occupation

³⁴ Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, p. 371; The Times (New York), November 19, 1919, p. 17.

³⁵ The Times (New York) November 16, 1919, p. 7.

of a new line marked out by the Allies. Turkish detachments which resisted the movement of Greek forces suffered considerable casualties on November 21 and 22, despite the fact that the Greeks were outnumbered four to one. It was claimed that 100 Turks were killed and 200 wounded. Feeble artillery activity was reported in the region of Aidin thirty miles southeast of Smyrna.³⁶

The New York Times reported that by December the Greeks had some 70,000 men around Smyrna. The Turks, it is noted, are as obstinate as ever swearing that they will not yield territory.³⁷ Cosmetatos estimated that by January, 1920 Kemalist forces numbered 50,000.³⁸

On February 16, 1920 Venizelos telegraphed from London to Athens regarding Lloyd George's statement that the British Prime Minister had:

³⁶The Times (New York) December 2, 1919, p. 17.

³⁷The Times (New York) December 5, 1919, p. 17.

³⁸Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, p. 302; Toynbee and Kirkwood in Turkey p. 92 state that by the end of 1919 there were 80,000 Greeks in the Smyrna hinterland and estimated that Turkish regulars numbered 40,000.

to struggle not only against the French Premier, who declared that Greece ought to be given only an economic sphere of influence, but also against the British Foreign Secretary.³⁹

Venizelos in a telegraph message from London related a conversation he had with the British Minister of War. The British War Minister, on behalf of Lloyd George, asked whether in the event Turkey refused to accept the peace terms Greece would see to the military imposition of these terms in Thrace and Asia Minor. Venizelos was told that Britain's multiple commitments did not permit her to send troops to help Greece. Venizelos was made to understand that aid from France and Italy should not be expected. Venizelos having no choice replied that Greece would undertake to impose the peace terms in the districts assigned.⁴⁰

Venizelos' telegraph message to Athens on March 26, 1920 sums up the predicament:

³⁹Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, p. 302; The French Premier and the British Foreign Secretary at the time were Alexnadre Millerand and Lord Curzon respectively; Cosmetatos cites Matin December 2, 1922, as source of secret Greek diplomatic documents.

⁴⁰Ibid.

The French Government's action in regard to Greece becomes more and more disturbing. As a result of a report from the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople, declaring that it is impossible to impose the peace terms on Turkey, the French Premier proposed a revision of the Supreme Council's resolutions. This was rejected by Britain. But we run the risk, all through these negotiations of seeing France act against our interests for the present Premier is entirely under the influence of financial circles.⁴¹

Venizelos understood that French financial corporations with vested interests in Turkey were exerting influence on Premier Millerand. French business interests sought to maintain Turkish rule with all the old safeguards such as the Capitulations and fiscal exemption over as large a portion of the Ottoman Empire as possible.

French financiers held sixty per cent of Turkey's pre-war debt and opposed the Greek occupation because they recognized that a viable Turkey could more easily repay the debt.⁴²

Henry Morgenthau notes that during the campaign of 1919, it was obvious to military observers of all nations that Turkish

⁴¹Ibid., p. 303; Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, p. 140.

⁴²Marjorie Housepian, The Smyrna Affair (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), pp. 69-70.

forces were continually supplied with munitions "bootlegged" to them by the Italians at Adalia.⁴³ Movement of arms was regularly reported to G.H.Q., Constantinople by Major Hadkinson, the British Intelligence officer in South-Western Anatolia. Guerilla bands which formed under Kemal's direction were allowed to use the Italian zone south of the Meander as a base to harass the flank of the Greek army.⁴⁴

According to Armstrong the Italians in the initial phase of the Anatolian war were the main Turkish source of supply for war materials.⁴⁵ It had become evident that the Allies were no longer in control of the situation in Asia Minor. In the months following the occupation, Churchill notes that the handful of British officers supervising the execution of the armistice were:

First ignored, then insulted, then chased for their lives or flung into arduous captivity. The 'dumps' in which the equipment of considerable armies had already been gathered passed in a week from British to Turkish control.⁴⁶

⁴³Henry Morgenthau, I Was Sent to Athens (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1929), p. 30.

⁴⁴Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 135.

⁴⁵Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 91.

⁴⁶Churchill, The Aftermath, pp. 388-89.

The British Government only gradually realized that the Greek military position had become untenable.⁴⁷ Shortly before the San Remo Conference Admiral de Robeck the British High Commissioner at Constantinople caused to be circulated a dispatch which expressed an attitude which was to have significance. The dispatch stated in part that "men for the most part with life-long experience of Near Eastern affairs" described the Greek occupation as "the canker in the Near Eastern situation". His opinion was that the proposed Greek occupation of Asia Minor would result in bloodshed for generations.⁴⁸

Armstrong wrote:

The British had orders to avoid any complications and they retired as the Turks advanced, so that by April 1920 the whole of Anatolia, except the area round Smyrna held by the Greeks was in the hands of the "Nationalists", as the Turks under Mustapha Kemal were now called. Behind a screen of irregulars they organized, collected money and formed an administration.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 92.

⁴⁸Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, p. 272.

⁴⁹Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 88.

X

FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY

France and Great Britain had long been rivals over various parts of the Middle East. In the immediate postwar period their respective foreign policies conflicted in regard to the European settlement. French attempts to exploit victory in Europe were frustrated by the British. It is therefore not surprising that Franco-British European differences exacerbated a traditional rivalry in the Middle East.

Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East undermined Allied support for Greece's rightful claim in Anatolia. As it became increasingly apparent that Venizelos was under Lloyd George's influence, French jealousy increased and French support of the Greek cause steadily diminished. It was not until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles that the French and British policies diverged. The French did not openly break with the British because it was desired to maintain a common front against Germany.¹

The fundamental aims of British foreign policy in the Middle East remained the same: The protection of the routes

¹Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 39.

to India through the Eastern Mediterranean necessitated the establishment of direct or indirect control over the Moslem areas adjacent to the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, and over the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. British advantages included a pre-war hold on Egypt, her support of the Arab revolt, and the fact that Britain had borne almost the entire weight of the fighting against the Turks which enabled her to obtain substantially all her objectives in Arab areas.

The ambitions and counter-claims of France and Italy placed difficulties in the path of such direct action in Constantinople and Anatolia. The Middle East settlement had been predetermined by wartime secret treaties. The collapse of Russia and the repudiation of the secret treaties by the Soviet Government reopened the question of the future of Constantinople and the Straits. British pledges to the Arabs were incompatible with what had been promised to the French.

The Armistice of Mudros left Constantinople and the Straits, as well as Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia in British possession. The French were dependent on British support in Syria. The British occupation of Constantinople was opposed by the French and the Italians. Oil was significantly responsible for much

Anglo-French friction in Mesopotamia and Mosul.²

Toynbee sums up the question of Franco-British rivalry by noting that:

France was backing Turkey tentatively against Russia and vigorously against Greece because Greece had been backed by Great Britain. Great Britain was backing Greece against Turkey because an aggrandized Greece dependent on British support would save Great Britain the trouble of herself imposing her Eastern peace-terms.³

As early as June, 1919 M. Pichon in private correspondence with Prince Heritier promised to assist Turkish aspirations.⁴ It was rumored in September, 1919 that Great Britain concluded on September 12th a secret treaty with Ferid Pasha which gave England control over Constantinople and dominance in the Straits. It is not known which country was responsible for starting the rumor but as a result in the same month M. Picot went to Sivas to negotiate with Kemal and his lieutenants. The latter proposed recognition of a French economic "mandate" over Turkey in return for a special regime in Cilicia.⁵

²Alastos, Venizelos, p. 196.

³Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 39.

⁴Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 92.

⁵Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 458; Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, p. 134.

The French government, already aggrieved by the lack of British support in regard to her Rhine policy and the question of German reparations, became increasingly concerned by the signs of British supremacy at Constantinople. By November, 1919 the French press unanimously expressed themselves in wanting the Greeks to leave Smyrna claiming that "the new conditions call for new solutions".⁶ The French minimized Turkish atrocities and strongly condemned the Greeks for similar charges on a minor scale.⁷ French officers in Turkey openly sided with the Turks and appeared on the same speaking platforms with nationalist revolutionaries. The Moniteur, the Stambul and other papers were subsidized with French money to publish anti-British articles.⁸

In December, 1919 Clemenceau visited London and was persuaded by Curzon and Lloyd George to agree to an international regime. This proposal was however rejected by the British Cabinet on January 6, 1920. The British policy thereafter was

⁶ Henry H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 123, 128; Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, p. 302.

⁷ Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 442.

⁸ Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, p. 93.

to maintain the Sultanate in Constantinople and imposing on him peace terms that would satisfy British interests.⁹

During the early part of 1920 the French suffered defeat in Cilicia. In the subsequent evacuation of Marash an estimated 15,000-30,000 Armenians were massacred.¹⁰ The French thereafter favored coming to terms with the Turks in order to protect the French position in Syria.

French financiers were of the opinion that the extension of Greek territory at the expense of Turkey would result in a diminution of French influence in such concerns as the Banque Ottomane, the Regie des Tobacs, and the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.¹¹ It has been previously mentioned that French financiers held sixty percent of Turkey's pre-war debt and therefore opposed Greek claims for it was felt that a viable and friendly Turkey would be more inclined to repay. In addition, French financiers were apprehensive over the British desire to internationalize the Berlin-to-Bagdad railway.

⁹W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles. (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1940), pp. 49-50.

¹⁰Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, pp. 272-73.

¹¹Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, pp. 100-02.

French interests amounted to thirty percent while the railway was still under German control. French financiers desirous of dominating this most important railway regarded international control as more advantageous to the British.¹²

The French were, in addition, influenced by religious interests. Roman Catholic missions, churches, and schools were prohibited from proselytizing Orthodox Greeks and Armenians by Article I of the Greek Constitution.¹³

According to Pallis, the dominant factor influencing the French Government's opposition to Greece's claim in Anatolia was the unfavorable military situation in Turkey after the Armistice. French political and military advisors in the Middle East were convinced that the drastic terms contemplated could not be enforced on a recalcitrant Turkey.¹⁴

¹²Housepian, The Smyrna Affair, pp. 69-70.

¹³Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, pp. 100-02.

¹⁴Ibid.

XI

THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

The Greek Government at a time of hostile press criticism over Greek conduct in Smyrna and Menemen decided to show its good will. On June 30 Venizelos proposed to the British Government that a commission of inquiry be formed to conduct a local investigation. The commission according to Venizelos' proposal should be composed of one British officer and one Greek officer of high rank. Kitsikis suggests the possibility that Venizelos' decision was made to prevent such a proposition from being made by some other member of the Conference.¹

On the same day that Venizelos proposed the creation of a commission, he sent a telegram to Ronald Burrows expressing the hope that:

This inquiry would prove, despite the poor conduct which can be explained by the memory of an ancestral hatred, that the attitude of our army was in general much better than the reports of the first few days led one to believe. In case were it to be proven that these reports were worse than I thought, I would favor the severe punishment of those responsible. This being the only way to restore our shaken prestige...²

¹Kitsikis, La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference, p. 271.

²Ibid., pp. 271-72.

H. E. G. Caclamanos, the Greek Minister to the Court of St. James, was charged with proposing the formation of the commission. The British Foreign Office answered that the proposition of the Greek Government was unacceptable, because this question was the concern of the Council of Four. Great Britain apparently did not want to give the impression of acting along without the other Allies. Greece opposed the incorporation of an Italian member to the commission because of the hostile Italian attitude and obvious conflict of interest.³

The Greek occupation resulted in serious misunderstanding between the Commission of Greek Affairs and Venizelos, as well as in the Supreme Council. There were complaints of excesses committed by the Greek troops. The High Inter-Allied Commissioners complained to the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna, M. Sterghiades against excesses of power. The Supreme Council therefore decided on July 21 to send an Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry, in which the Big Four were represented, Italy included. It was composed of Rear-Admiral Bristol, Brigadier General R. A. Hare, appointed by General Milne; Brigadier General Bunoust appointed by Franchet d'Esperey and the Italian Lieutenant-General A. Dall'Olio. It held forty-six sessions

³Ibid., p. 272.

from the twelfth of August to October 14. The commission visited Smyrna, Aidin, Girova, Nazili, Odemis, Menemen, Manisa, and Aivali. It heard 175 witnesses and submitted its report on October 14.⁴

Colonel A. Mazarakis, a Greek officer was authorized to follow the work of the commission but was not to participate in the writing of the conclusion.⁵

The commission sent by the Allied and Associated Powers arranged an armistice line but was unable to "demobilize the forces already opposing one another in this new war."⁶ Fighting between the Greeks and the Turks continued as the commission continued to investigate. Law and order prevailed in Smyrna, however guerilla fighting was reported continuing

⁴Ibid.; Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, p. 368; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, III., p. 153; Albrecht-Carrie in Italy at the Peace Conference, p. 314 records that the decision to send an inquiry was made July 22; According to Miller, Diary, XIX, p. 569 the Supreme Council agreed to send the commission on July 18.

⁵Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, p. 368.

⁶Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 78.

on the outskirts of the city.⁷

The committee completed its investigations on October 14. Its report, which was examined by the Supreme Council on November 8, held the Greeks responsible for various outrages. It held that Moslem protests which followed the occupation were justified. The commission accepted the fact that the terms of the Armistice had been satisfactorily abided by. It was reported that the occupation had been accompanied by the most regrettable excesses. When the vali of Smyrna received from Admiral Calthorpe the note which announced the landing, he was stupefied, especially to learn that the occupation was to be by Greek troops. Admiral Calthorpe told the vali who had tears in his eyes that these were the orders from Paris. The vali requested that the occupation be not limited to Greek troops while warning that the consequences would be grave. He asked that the Great Powers disembark two or three hundred Allied sailors to uphold Moslem morale and to permit him to say that it was not a question of a definitive reunion to Greece. The answer again was negative.⁸

⁷The Times (New York) September 12, 1919, p. 17; Toynbee notes that the Commission opened hearings at Smyrna on August 24, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, xviii.

⁸Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, pp. 368-71.

The commission unanimously concluded that the initial cause of the troubles had its origin in religious animosities. The Greeks were accused of not having done anything to overcome this religious hatred. The occupation instead of being a civilizing mission immediately took on "the aspect of a conquest and a crusade".⁹

The commission stated that if the military occupation had as its goal the maintenance of security and public order, that it should not have been limited to Greek troops. It would have been preferable to have included Allied troops under the authority of a superior Allied commander in Asia Minor. The Greek occupation could only be maintained if the Peace Conference was resolved to pronounce the complete and definitive annexation of the country to Greece. Only under such circumstances should liberty of action be left to the Greek commander vis-a-vis the Turkish forces. In the commission's opinion annexation would be against the principle respecting nationalities. In the occupied region, even around the city of Smyrna and Aivali, the Turks were in an uncontested majority. The commission dutifully reported that Turkish national sentiment which manifested its resistance would not

⁹Ibid., p. 370.

accept such annexation. The report noted that a Greek military expedition by itself would not have a chance of success.¹⁰

The commission accordingly proposed the withdrawal and replacement of all or part of the Greek troops by Allied troops as soon as possible. To protect Greek self-esteem, it was decided that part of the Greek troops cooperate in the occupation. It was recommended that the Greek troops be placed in the interior of the occupied region to keep them from encountering Turkish nationalist forces.¹¹

Venizelos, who was informed that the report had been examined by the Supreme Council on November 8, protested against its acceptance. As previously mentioned it had been decided at the time of the commission's creation that a Greek officer should be allowed to follow the proceedings, but not to vote or take part in the preparation of the report. The commission, however, when it began its inquiries, decided not to allow any Greek representative to be present. The purported

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 370-71; W. A. Rightcliff "Le traite de Sevres" La vie des peuples, III, January-April, 1921. pp. 247-48; An unofficial version of the Committee's report was published as early as October, 1919. Rightcliff's above mentioned article, pp. 247-48 includes what was claimed to be the conclusion of the Committee's Report.

¹¹ Ibid.

reason was that Turkish witnesses might be afraid of giving evidence. On being informed of this violation of procedural rules, Venizelos insisted on the right that the accused should be present, to know the charges and evidence presented, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence in rebuttal. The Supreme Council decided in Venizelos' favor, but before it could alter the procedure of the committee, the inquiry was completed.¹²

Venizelos argued for the suppression of the committee's report. In addition he complained that the members of the inquiry had shown bias in favor of the Turkish nationalists. Alastos mentions that the pro-Turkish bias of the commission's head, Admiral Bristol, was especially evident. Witnesses for the accused were never heard. Only confirmed opponents, practically all of whom were Turkish, were questioned.¹³ Venizelos pointed out that the commission had been unduly harsh in its censure of the Greek press or the friends of Greece and overly tolerant of the Turkish press and its insults to Greece. He mentioned that this attitude encouraged those who made trouble.

¹²Alastos, Venizelos, p. 193.

¹³Ibid.; It is interesting to note that Bristol was soon after appointed U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople.

He affirmed his approbation and full confidence in M. Sterghiades. Venizelos asked that the report be rejected and suppressed and that another investigation be conducted.¹⁴ The Supreme Council agreed that Venizelos' objections were justified and sent only a cautionary note to the Greek Government which reaffirmed its earlier decision of May by permitting continued Greek occupation.¹⁵

The suppression of this report accompanied by atrocity stories caused severe criticism of the Greek capacity for ruling a mixed population.¹⁶ The report of the Commission of Inquiry, also referred to as the Bristol Commission after its Chairman, was never officially published. An unofficial version known as the Britol Report was leaked to the press

¹⁴Driault et Lheretier, La Grece et la grande guerre, p. 371; The Times (New York) November 16, 1919, p. 7.

¹⁵Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.314.

¹⁶Mavrogordato, Modern Greece, p. 123; House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p. 196.

and resulted in much unfavorable publicity for the Greeks.¹⁷

Ahmed Emin's Turkey in the World War, mentions the fact that the Inter-Allied censor in Constantinople permitted the publication in newspapers of atrocity stories and that such authorization supported the veracity of such stories. He points out that although the official report of the commission was suppressed and never officially published, the Paris Eclair, published in October, what were claimed to be excerpts. The Turkish press, Emin notes, was permitted to reproduce such excerpts with the stipulation that there be no commentary.¹⁸

Halide Edib remarks that the report was not published until the Graeco -Turkish campaign was fairly advanced, by which time, European public opinion began to doubt the wisdom of the Greek occupation of Smyrna.¹⁹ Although the report was suppressed by the Supreme Council for good reasons which have been discussed, it nevertheless provided a rationalization for the modification of the Treaty of Sevres on the grounds that

¹⁷Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 78.

¹⁸Ahmed Emin Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 274-75.

¹⁹Edib, The Turkish Ordeal, p. 62.

Great Britain, France, and Italy had been ill-informed.²⁰

The Report of the Commission of Inquiry, or the Bristol Report, is not to be confused with the King-Crane Report. Because various proposals had been made to the Supreme Council for the United States to assume a mandate for Turkey, President Wilson created a commission to report to him on the attitude of the populace towards the Americans. At the request, and by special appointment of the American President, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane were delegated to conduct an inquiry. The commission, referred to as the King-Crane Commission, travelled about and investigated during the late spring and summer months of 1919, returning to Paris in September.²¹

The conclusions of the King-Crane Commission about Smyrna are strikingly similar to those of the Bristol Report. Like the Bristol Report, the King-Crane Report was suppressed and published unaccountedly as a suppressed document in 1922.²² The reasons for its suppression however did not have anything

²⁰Sforza, Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles, p. 63; Ibid, Makers of Modern Europe, p. 367.

²¹James L. Barton, Story of Near East Relief, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 140.

²²"The King-Crane Report on the Near East." Editor and Publisher, LV, December 2, 1922, I-XVII; U.S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, XII, pp. 745-863; Part III, Sections V and VI of the King-Crane report is included as Appendix F.

to do with complaints of the Greek Government. The late date of its publication caused it to have a negligible effect on the course of events that are the concern of this study.

The Report of the King-Crane Commission was suppressed because the Allies felt its findings would embarrass the Peace Conference. Major General G. Harbord's American Military Mission to Turkey and Armenia recognized that a commitment of troops was necessary if America was to assume an Armenian mandate. Harbord's Mission noted that local opposition was rapidly developing thus putting acceptance of the Armenian mandate out of the question.²³

The commission had made recommendations not only about Smyrna but about the larger question of the disposition of the Ottoman Empire. The commission recommended that no territory be set aside for the Greeks, instead it suggested that Smyrna become autonomous under a general mandate for Turkey. The American Government, according to Howard, "saw fit to suppress" the findings because of reluctance of assuming any mandate. The King-Crane Commission recommended that the United States assume a general mandate which was to include Armenia, the Constantinopolitan state, a new Turkish state, and Smyrna.

²³Barton, Story of Near East Relief, p. 141.

The commission reported anti-French sentiment in Syria and great popular support for Feisal which undermined the French position in Syria and Cilecia.²⁴

²⁴Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 238; "The King-Crane Report in the Near East." Editor and Publisher, LV, December 2, 1922, p. XVIII.

XII

THE SAN REMO CONFERENCE

The Allies met at San Remo from April 19 to April 26 to discuss German disarmament, the question of mandates, and the Turkish peace settlement. French and British policy differed markedly on the question of German disarmament. France was given a Mandate for Syria, while Great Britain was given a Mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia. Palestine in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of December 2, 1917 was to be "a national home for the Jewish people." It had previously been decided that the Turks were to remain in Constantinople. After much delicate discussion, the internationalization of the Straits was agreed to in principle.¹

At the San Remo Conference the Great Powers decided that only limited support would be given to the aspirations of the Armenians. This decision was portentous for the rights of the Greeks, especially in light of the fact that the Great Powers had committed Greece in Asia Minor. The Powers were willing to provide arms and ammunition but were unwilling to commit their own troops. The League of Nations refused to accept the Mandate for Armenia because it was recognized that it could not be defended against the Turks.²

¹R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925 (London: Edward Arnold and Company, 1927), pp. 203-04.

²Ibid., p. 203.

Lloyd George made it clear that the war-weary Great Powers were not willing or capable of assuming the burden of a sustained effort necessary in fighting a guerilla war in the interior of Anatolia. He encouraged Greek hopes by stating that although war in the interior was out of the question the above prohibition did not apply to the littoral of Asia Minor.³

Lloyd George expressed misgivings about treaties which the Allied Powers were not prepared to enforce or had any intention of enforcing. Military experts insisted that an enormous army would be necessary to defeat Kemal and none had the intention of raising such a force. Lloyd George nevertheless believed that it was militarily feasible for Greece to defend Smyrna against the harassments of Kemal's forces.⁴

Lloyd George criticized Lord Curzon's credulous acceptance of Boghos Nubar Pasha's confident assertions that the Armenian people were capable of defending their state if only the Allies supplied munitions and equipment.⁵ The Greeks, according to

³Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 860.

⁴Ibid., pp. 845-46.

⁵Ibid., p. 850.

Lloyd George, were not asked to penetrate the interior of Asia Minor but merely to defend entrenched positions in the Smyrna area. The British Prime Minister claims to have been assured by Venizelos that such was feasible.⁶

The terms of the Turkish peace treaty were worked out at the San Remo Conference and were presented to the Turkish delegation shortly thereafter, on May 11. Constantinople and the Straits were internationalized; Great Britain was to receive Cyprus, Egypt, and the Suez Canal as well as a mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine; Morocco and Tunis were given to France as well as a mandate for Syria, Italy's share of the Anatolian settlement consisted of the Dodecanese Islands.⁷

Article 69 stated that although Smyrna was to be nominally under Turkish sovereignty, Turkey "transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of her rights of sovereignty. In witness of such sovereignty the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over an outer fort in the town of Smyrna."

Article 72 stated that a local Parliament was to be set up and insured "proportional representation of all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic and religious minorities." The Greek Government was to be permitted to

⁶Ibid., p. 861.

⁷The official text of the terms of the Turkish peace treaty was printed in Current History Magazine, published by The Times (New York), volume 13, part 2; pp. 164-84, January, 1921.

postpone the elections up to one year to permit the return of inhabitants who had been banished or deported by the Turkish authorities. It was thus officially recognized in the treaty that the Greek element had diminished considerably in population.

Article 75 provided for the protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities and freedom of commerce and transit. Article 76 permitted the incorporation of this area into the Greek customs system. Incorporation of the Smyrna district into the Kingdom of Greece was made possible by Article 83 which provided that the local Parliament request such and that it would be dependent on the outcome of a plebiscite. The plebiscite was to be held five years from the date of the signing of the treaty.

The clauses of the Turkish treaty which concerned Greece were moderate, especially when compared to the treaty rights awarded to the Great Powers. Greece's sound claim was based on the principle of nationality, not blatantly imperialism as in the treaty rights accorded the Great Powers. Unfortunately for Greece the bonds of the war-time alliance were rapidly dissolving because of Anglo-French rivalry. The French, according to Lloyd George, had been in favor of awarding the

southwest corner of Asia Minor to the Greeks until the Treaty of Versailles. Thereafter French policy was lukewarm.⁸ The French previously were apparently concerned with presenting a united front against Germany. With the agreement on the German treaty they became increasingly concerned with the Near Eastern question. The French were jealously apprehensive that Great Britain might exercise predominant influence in the Near East. It was thought that supporting Greece in Asia Minor would further British influence in Anatolia. France was prepared to sacrifice Greece if such a policy would thwart Great Britain from achieving hegemony in the Near East.

President Wilson left Paris at the end of June. When he expressed his opinion of the draft of the Turkish treaty at the end of March, 1920 he said:

In regard to the arrangements for Smyrna, this Government is not in a position to express an opinion, as the question is too important to be passed on with the limited information this Government has as to the exact arrangement that is contemplated and the reasons for the same.⁹

Such an expression of opinion typifies the aloof and isolationist attitude toward Middle Eastern issues maintained by the American Government. The government of the United States, after having committed Greece in Anatolia, sought to avoid the responsibility of becoming involved.

⁸Lloyd George, Memoirs, II, p. 823.

⁹Contemporary Review 117; 884-6, June 1920, p. 886.

XIII

CONCLUSION

Greece was given a mandate by the Supreme Council to assume military occupation of Smyrna. The ostentatious reason was to prevent massacres but the real reason was to forestall an imminent Italian landing. Although at first it was announced that the occupation was temporary, the Supreme Council's decision signified the awarding of Smyrna to Greece. Despite diplomatic jargon to the contrary, the Supreme Council decision of May 6 implicitly recognized that Smyrna was to be eventually placed under Greek administration. Such was not only judicious and rational but represented a fait accompli. The Supreme Council indirectly reaffirmed its decision by permitting the continuation of the Greek occupation. If the future of the Smyrna district was yet undecided the Supreme Council should not have permitted the Greek expedition.

The justice of the Greek claims to Smyrna was recognized by the Supreme Council at the San Remo Conference. The Supreme Council because of the soundness of the Greek claims decided in the draft of the Turkish treaty that Greece ought to administer Smyrna.

The Allies, after having committed Greece to the Smyrna occupation, were not willing to provide adequate military support. Public opinion in Great Britain, France, and the United States clamored for demobilization. The Allied and Associated Powers because of war-weariness were unwilling to commit men in a fresh campaign in Turkey. The extent and the nature of the fighting between the Greeks and the Turks in 1919 pointed out the difficulties involved.

The traditional Franco-British rivalry in the Near East and the conflicting ambitions of Italy and Greece gave strength to the Nationalist movement. The Allies because of rivalries and self-interest did little to enforce their will upon the Turks. Turkish resistance could hardly have succeeded if both Great Britain and France had loyally supported Greece. British policy was characterized by half-measures. The French and the Italian Governments gave unofficial encouragement and support to the Turks. The retention of Smyrna by Greece became physically impossible due to the lack of effective Allied support and the unwillingness of the Allied Powers to coerce Turkey. The Allies did not attempt to crush the nationalist rebellion which was threatening not only the Ottoman Empire but the Turkish peace treaty as well.

The French and the Italians became more Turcophile as the British influence over the Greeks became more evident. Conventually the split in Allied policy is dated from the end of 1919 but the jealousy was deep-seated, existing from the time of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros. French support of the Nationalist Turks gradually increased as British support of Greece gradually diminished. British Conservatives opposed supporting Greece for they feared that a renewal of war would result in Moslem agitation which would weaken the British position in Mesopotamia, Mosul, and Bagdad, as well as in Moslem portions of India. The French, who were having difficulty in Cilicia, were also afraid of jeopardizing their position in Syria. Great Britain and France were guilty of moral callousness for refusing to submerge their rivalries and making the necessary sacrifices to support Greece's just territorial claims.

The "war to end wars" went on between Greece and Turkey until the latter part of 1922. It culminated in the disaster at Smyrna and the flight of 1,400,000 refugees from Anatolia. The history of Greece's claims to Smyrna and the ignominious desertion by the Allies represents international diplomacy at low ebb.

XIV

EPILOGUE

The terms of the Turkish treaty emerged from the San Remo Conference. The Turks precastinated, while Turkish Nationalist forces threatened British forces on the Ismid Peninsula. At the Spa Conference Greece was authorized by the Supreme Council to launch an offensive and pacify the whole of the northwestern district of Asia Minor. The British Government encouraged the Greeks by issuing a loan.¹ The success of the Greek military offensive caused the Ottoman Government to submit to the peace terms and accordingly the Treaty of Sevres was signed August 10, 1920.

Italy's Premier that same day declared that the signatures of the Italian representatives Bonin and Marietti did not amount to ratification. French Government circles let it be known that the treaty would never be submitted to the Ottoman Parliament for ratification.² This was apparently a preferred outcome because the French felt that support of Greece was bolstering British policy rather than furthering their own aims. The Treaty of Sevres was never ratified by

¹Mavrogordato, Modern Greece, p. 124.

²Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, p. 305.

by the Turkish Parliament and the Allies remained technically at war with Turkey until August, 1923.

The terms of the Treaty of Sevres were never made effective for the Allies refused to enforce its terms. The denunciation of the treaty by the Turkish Nationalists made it evident that the treaty could only be imposed by force. Enforcement of its terms, as in the case of disarmament as provided for in the Armistice of Mudros, entailed a vast expenditure in men and money.

The defeat of Venizelos in the election of 1920 and the subsequent recall of King Constantine provided a pretext, or rationale, for the Great Powers to evade their obligations towards their former ally. Wartime propaganda depicted King Constantine as pro-German and anti-Ally. Cosmetatos' study, The Tragedy of Greece, documents the view that criticism of the Greek king was not only exaggerated, but unjust.³ The Supreme Council in a note of December 3 informed the Greek Government that "this step would create a new and unfavorable situation in relations between Greece and the Allies" and that "the three Governments reserved to themselves in that case complete liberty in dealing with the situation thus created."⁴ A second

³Ibid.

⁴Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 412.

note dated December 6th informed the Greek Government that Allied credits would be stopped.⁵ The French and the Italian Governments whose interests were opposed to those of Greece on the question of the Turkish peace settlement, had their pretext. This pretext is neither convincing or self evident because signs of a rapprochement existed before the Greek elections. M. Phillippe Millet in defence of the abandonment of Greece stated that the French attitude was based on three considerations: (1) a strong Turkey; (2) a regard for the French Moslem colonies; and (3) the Straits.⁶

The Great Powers, having sent Greece to Asia Minor and thus jeopardized the safety of all the local Greek and Armenian population, began secretly discussing a revision of the Treaty of Sevres from the time that this treaty was signed. The Great Powers recognizing the rapid growth and the strength of the Nationalist forces were desirous of a quick solution which would protect their interests- the Capitulations, the Ottoman

⁵Cosmetatos, The Tragedy of Greece, p. 307.

⁶Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, p. 564.

Public Debt, the multiform concessions, and economic spheres of influence, and the freedom of the Straits. These interests for the Allies were to prove of greater importance than the lives of hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians in Anatolia.

The Great Powers, seeking to extricate themselves from commitments made to Greece, held a series of conferences at which treaty revision was discussed. Beginning with the London Conference (February-March, 1921) representatives from two Turkish delegations were permitted to attend, that is, one from Constantinople and the other representing the Turkish Nationalists. The Supreme Council thus accorded what amounted to de facto recognition to the Nationalists. The French and Italian Governments used this opportunity to initiate secret negotiations. French public opinion demanded a solution because of the heavy cost in maintaining necessary garrisons in Cilicia and Syria and to relieve the necessity of further military operations.

The Conference of London confirmed the system of mandates by which France and Great Britain protected their respective interests in Syria, Iraq and Palestine. The Straits it was agreed

were to be internationalized. Turkey recognized the British protectorate in Egypt and the annexation of Cyprus, and the Italian position in the Dodecanese. The Allies were planning their compromises at the vicarious expense of the Greeks and the Armenians. It was proposed that Adrianople and hinterland be returned to Turkey while the plebiscite for the incorporation of Smyrna into the Kingdom of Greece at the end of five years as provided in the Treaty of Sevres was to be forgotten. Greece which had already sacrificed too many dead and wounded, and expended much of its national revenue answered that the Middle East settlement as proposed by the Allies was unacceptable.

The Allied Governments, seeing the failure of their attempts at mediation, declared their neutrality and their unwillingness to sanction the capture of Constantinople. The declaration of neutrality by the Allies was repeated in May by joint proclamation.⁷

Count Sforza, on behalf of the Italian Government, concluded an Italo-Turkish Agreement on March 13, 1921 with Bekir Sami Bey. Italy surrendered its territorial claims for concessions in raw material. Italy's right of economic exploitation,

⁷Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, VI., p. 44.

euphemistically referred to as collaboration, was recognized in Adalia, Afium-Karahissar, Kutaiah, Aidin, Konya and the coal mines of Heraclea. The Italians in addition to giving up territorial claims in Asia Minor agreed to support all the demands of the Nationalists Government relative to the treaty of peace, especially the restoration of Thrace and Smyrna.⁸ The Italian Government henceforth gave direct help and encouragement to the Turkish Nationalists.

French sympathy for the Turkish cause was not mitigated by the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship between the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks on March 16, 1921. Bolshevik supplies of arms and funds had been significant factors in the eventual triumph of the Turkish Nationalists.

Nonetheless, Allied efforts at mediation continued. The Greek Government explained in a diplomatic note of June 25 that "while thanking her great Allies "for their offer of mediation of June 21, Greece sought only to continue the task undertaken with "her great Allies" during the war by imposing the Treaty of Sevres by force of arms.⁹

On August 10, 1921, one year after the Treaty of

⁸Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, pp. 104-05 includes the text of the Italo-Turkish Agreement in the appendix of his work.

⁹Mavrogordato, Modern Greece, p. 137.

Sevres had been signed, the Supreme War Council declared the neutrality of England, France, Italy, and Japan, with respect to the war being fought in the Middle East.¹⁰

The divergence of Anglo-French policy in the Near East was marked with the signing of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October, 1921. It was more than an agreement for it signified the signing of a separate peace with Turkey without consulting Great Britain.¹¹ Accordingly the state of war was to cease, prisoners exchanged and full amnesty for war crimes. France was to retire from Cilicia and in turn was guaranteed security in Syria and iron, chrome, and silver concessions in the Kharshut Valley. In addition there was to be economic collaboration and the French were to have the right of priority in regard to concessions.¹² It meant the abandonment by France of her Allies and represented a complete break with Great Britain in support of Greece.

The agreement was a significant diplomatic victory for the Turkish Kemalists for it meant French recognition of the Angora Assembly. The withdrawal of French troops from Cilicia

¹⁰Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, p. 292; Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, p. 565.

¹¹Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, p. 277.

¹²Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p. 261.

permitted 80,000 Turkish troops to change fronts and concentrate forces against the Greeks along the Sakarya River. Supplies and ammunition left by the French command was sufficient to equip 40,000 Turks. Although direct aid was prohibited by the London Conference, the Nationalists received veiled or indirect support.

The Greeks suffered a severe military reverse along the front of the Sakarya River in August, 1921. By February, 1922 it was generally agreed that the situation of the Greeks had become desperate. The Allies at the Paris Conference in March proposed a drastic revision of the Treaty of Sevres. The Greeks and the Constantinople Government accepted. The Kemalists, however, refused to grant an armistice, except on the basis of an immediate and unconditional evacuation of Anatolia to be completed within four months.

Although the Turks were receiving aid from the Bolsheviks, France, and Italy, Great Britain in March denied a desperate Greek plea for war material and financial aid urging a diplomatic solution.¹³ At the end of July a request by the Greek Government for permission to occupy Constantinople was refused. This perhaps would have permitted honorable Greek evacuation and strengthened the Greek position at peace negotiations.¹⁴

¹³Ibid., p. 265; Frangulis, La Grece et la crise mondiale, II, pp. 352-53; Zetland, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, pp. 283-84.

¹⁴Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 442.

Before negotiations could be resumed at another conference the Turks occupied Smyrna September 9. The Greek troops evacuated the town and refugees fled. The Greek quarter was completely destroyed in a fire which lasted a week. The Turkish occupation was accompanied by much slaughter, looting, and rapine. All able-bodied Greek men aged sixteen to fifty were driven into the interior where most perished of forced labor, starvation, and murder.¹⁵

The armistice was concluded by General Harrington, Allied Commander-in-Chief in Constantinople on October 11. The Greeks signed the agreement on October 14.

On November 20, 1922 the Allied signatories of the Treaty of Sevres met at Lausanne with the Turkish Nationalists in an attempt to arrive at a Middle East settlement. The Turks capitalized on the hatred of the Italians for the Greeks, and on Anglo-French rivalry. Negotiations ended inconclusively on January 24, 1923.

The Lausanne Conference reassembled April 23, 1923 and the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed July 24, 1923. Greece was forced to surrender the just benefits pledged in the Treaty of Sevres. Greece lost Eastern Thrace with Adrianople and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. Turkey was to retain full

¹⁵Morgenthau, I Was Sent to Athens, p. 47.

sovereignty of Smyrna and the remainder of the Anatolian peninsula. Although Greek claims were sacrificed the Great Powers had Turkey relinquish all claims upon Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the rest of Arabia.

XV

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY

1915

- Jan. 24 Sir E. Grey offered Greece concessions in Asia Minor; **First** memorandum of Venizelos to King proposed the cession of Kavalla and Drama to Bulgaria.
- Jan. 30 Second memorandum of Venizelos concerning the same subject sent.
- Jan. 30 Memorandum of Colonel Metaxas against the Greek participation in Dardanelles expedition.
- Feb. 19 First bombardment of Dardanelles.
- Feb. 25 Third naval bombardment of outer forts.
- March 2 Third Memorandum of Venizelos to the King.
- March 4 Treaty of London signed between Great Britain, France, and Russia, ceding to Russia, Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Thrace as far as Aenos-Midia line and the sandjak of Ismid as far as Sakarya River.
- March 6 Venizelos resigns on Dardanelles expedition.
- March 11 Allies occupy Lemnos.
- March 18 Disastrous attempt to force the Narrows.
- April 26 Secret Treaty of London signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy.
- May 31 General Election in Greece resulted in victory of Venizelist party.
- Aug. 21 Italy declared war on Turkey
- Oct. 1 Entente landed troops at Salonika.
- Oct. 5 Second disagreement of King Constantine and Venizelos over Greek intervention in the War. Venizelos resigned.
- Oct. 13 Great Britain offered Greece Cyprus.
- Oct. 29 King dissolved Chamber.

1916

- Jan.8 Evacuation of Dardanelles.
- April 10 Allied Powers informed the Greek Government of
 their intention to establish naval bases on the
 Greek Aegean Islands.
- May 16 Anglo-French agreement concerning Syria, Palestine,
 Mesopotamia and Anatolia.
- Aug.30 Outbreak of Salonika Revolutionary Movement (National
 Defense Movement).
- Sept. 29 Venizelos left Athens for Salonika.
- Oct. 9 Venizelos arrived in Salonika and formed a provisional
 Government.
- Nov. 27 The Greek Salonika Government declared war on Bulgaria
 and Germany.
- Dec. 1-2 Allied troops clash with Greek troops in Athens
 afterwhich the Allies imposed a blockade upon Greek
 territories under the Royal Government's control.

1917

- January Treaty between Russia, Great Britain, and France confirming Treaty of March 4, 1915 and ceding to Russia vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis; to France Syria and vilayet of Adana; to Great Britain Mesopotamia and Palestine.
- Jan. 11 Greece accepted the demands of the Allies.
- March 6 Secret agreement disclosed regarding partition of Asiatic Turkey.
- April 4 The United States declared war on Germany.
- April 10 Kerensky Government in Russia repudiated imperialistic Tsarist policies.
- April 19-21 St. Jean de Maurienne secret agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy. Italy assents to Sykes-Picot accord and receives concessions. Italy's zone of influence in Asia Minor expanded to include Smyrna. Subject to Russian ratification.
- June 11 Ultimatum presented by M. Jonnart, High Commissioner of the Allied Powers, to King Constantine's Government at Athens.
- June 14 Allies dethroned King Constantine.
- June 25 Venizelos returned to Athens, escorted by a French expeditionary force, from Salonika.
- June 27 Venizelist Greece declared war on Central Powers.
- August 18 Agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy in regard to Anatolia.

1918

Jan. 5 British Premier defined war aims.
Jan. 8 President Wilson announced "Fourteen points" as basis for World peace.
Oct. 8 Turkish emissaries sent to Allies from Smyrna to ask for peace.
Oct. 30 The United States notified Turkey that the request for armistice would be brought to the attention of Nations at war with Turkey. Turkish armistice signed at Mudros to go into effect the next noon, local time, October 31. Constantinople and all forst of Dardanelles and Bosphorus to be occupied by Allies; Turkish forces to be demobilized.
Nov. 9 British forces occupied forst along the Dardanelles.
Nov. 13 Allies fleet anchored off Constantinople.
Dec. 18 Ukraine expedition.

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1919

- Jan. 18 The Paris Peace Conference held first plenary session at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. Georges Clemenceau, premier of France, was elected president on nomination by President Wilson.
- April 1 Blockade against Turkey raised.
- April 24 Signor Orlando left Paris for Rome returning to Paris on May 5. Italian Delegation officially suspended its participation in the Peace Conference. After the return of the Italian delegation the deadlock over the Adriatic question continued.
- April 29 Italian troops landed at Adalia.
- May 15 Greek forces landed at Smyrna in accordance with mandate received from the Allied and Associated Powers.
- May 19 Mustapha Kemal lands at Samsun.
- May 21 M. Sterghiades arrived at Smyrna in capacity of High Commissioner.
- June 5 British War Office, in an official communique, attributed a Kurdish rising at Sulaimaniya to the instigation of Turkish agitators.
- June 17 -
July 4 Turkish delegates to Peace Conference asked to be heard on June 17. After exchange of notes the delegates were advised that nothing would be gained by a longer stay in Paris and on July 4, the mission left for Constantinople without a formal hearing.
- June 28 Treaty of Versailles signed.
- July 11 Mustapha Kemal Pasha outlawed by the Constantinople government.
- July 23 Turkish Nationalist Congress at Erzerum.
- July 29 Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement respecting Greek and Italian interests in Rhodes, the Dodecanese and the Meander Valley signed.

1919 - continued

- August 8 Turks proclaimed jihad against Greeks landed at Panderma.
- August 9 Anglo-Persian agreement signed.
- August 24 First meeting of the Commission of Inquiry sent to Smyrna by the Governments of the principal Allied Powers and the United States.
- August 28 Rear Admiral Bristol, U.S.N., appointed American High Commissioner at Constantinople.
- Sept. 9 Declaration of the Congress of Sivas; General Allenby arrived in Paris; Statement by Colonel Lawrence regarding Syrian question.
- Sept. 13 Turkish Nationalist Congress at Sivas ended.
- Sept. 20 Treaty of St. Germain.
- Sept. 26 Announcement that an agreement had been reached between France and Great Britain relative to Syria.
- September French occupied Cilicia.
- Oct. 7 Mustapha Kemal Pasha telegraphed to the Ottoman Government the peace terms formulated at the Congresses of Erzerum and Sivas.
- Oct. 18 Greece occupied Western Thrace.
- October Publication at Constantinople of summary report of the Allied Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.
- Nov. 4 Aintab taken over by French forces from the British; withdrawal of British forces from the Taurus begun.
- Nov. 27 Treaty of Neuilly.
- November
-December British forces replaced by French forces in Cilicia, and in Syria, as far south as the Palestine frontier. Completion announced by British War Office on December 10.

1920

- Jan. 11 Session of Ottoman Parliament began at Constantinople.
- Jan. 21 Turkish Nationalist forces attacked the French garrison at Marash.
- Jan. 27 Turkish Nationalist forces successfully raided an ammunition dump on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
- Jan. 28 Signatures by members of the Ottoman Parliament to the Turkish Nationalist Pact.
- Feb. 9 French garrison evacuated Marash; Armenian civilians massacred; Secret Memorandum of April, 1917 from Lord Balfour, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the French Government concerning final division of Asia Minor was made public.
- Feb. 20 British Prime Minister, in an important speech, announced that Allies had decided to have the Turks remain in Constantinople.
- March
2-24 In the House of Commons, Mr. Bonar Law refused to publish the report of the Allied Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.
- March 11 Emir Feisal proclaimed himself at Damascus, King of Syria; he had assumed the title previously.
- March 16 Ja'Far Bey, commanding the Turkish forces in Eastern Thrace, repudiated the authority of the Ottoman Government of Constantinople; Allies deport Nationalist Leaders to Malta. Many Turks escaped to Asia Minor; The Allied (British) occupation of Constantinople; Recall of Allied control officers from the interior of Anatolia.
- March
16-22 In the House of Commons, Lloyd George refused to publish the report of the Smyrna Commission of Inquiry.

1920 - continued

- March 22 Lebanon independence proclaimed at Baalbeck.
- April 6 All British force in Anatolia, east of Ismid, withdrawn into the Ismid Peninsula.
- April 10 French garrison of Urfa, which had capitulated to the Nationalist forces on condition of receiving a safe conduct, were massacred on the march.
- April 18-27 Conference of Allied Powers at San Remo. Great Britain to be mandatory for Mesopotamia and Palestine; France for Syria, Armenian mandate offered to the United States; Oil agreement.
- April 23 Grand National Assembly met at Angora. Formal break between Angora and Constantinople.
- April Before the end of April a Military convention was concluded by the Governments of Angora and Moscow.
- May 6 Peace delegation of the Porte arrived at Paris.
- May 11 Peace delegation of the Porte given draft of peace treaty and allowed one month for consideration; Sublime Porte envoys request delay until July 11.
- May 12 Draft of the Peace Treaty published in the British Press.
- May 28 French garrison of Bozanty taken prisoner by Turkish Nationalist forces, while attempting to retreat to coast.
- June 15 Turkish Nationalist forces attacked the British Indian garrison of Ismid.
- June 19-21 Hythe Conference.

1920 - continued

- June 21-22 Conference of Allied Powers at Boulogne; Greek Prime Minister Venizelos announced that this Conference had sanctioned military action in Anatolia by Greece.
- June 22 Greek offensive against Turkish Nationalist Forces began. Greeks occupied Brusa and Panderma.
- June Political understanding between Soviet Russia and Kemalists.
- July 7 Turkish ultimatum to Armenia.
- July 20 Greeks occupied Eastern Thrace.
- August 10 Treaty of Sevres signed.
- August 24 First Turco-Soviet Agreement.
- Oct. 3 Reactionary rebellion at Konya.
- Oct. 25 King Alexander of Greece died. Second Greek offensive. Capture of Yenishehr and Inegiol.
- Oct. 30 Turks capture Kars.
- Nov. 14 General elections in Greece; Defeat of Venizelos.
- Nov. 20 Plebiscite for the recall of King Constantine.
- Dec. 5 Plebiscite recalled King Constantine by almost unanimous vote.
- Dec. 19 King Constantine arrived at Athens.

1921

- Jan. 6 Third Greek offensive; First Turkish victory of In Eunu.
- Feb. 25 Kemalists attended Conference of London.
- March 9 Franco-Turkish agreement in regard to evacuation of Cilicia. Not ratified.
- March 12 Turco-Italian treaty for the conomic exploitation of southern Anatolia.
- March 16 Treaty of Moscow between Turkey and Soviets.
- March 23 Fourth Greek offensive. Second Turkish victory of In Eunu.
- July 10 Fifth Greek offensive.
- July 19 Greeks occupy Eskishehr.
- August 10 Supreme War Council declared that Greece and Turkish Nationalists were engaged in a private war and proclaimed neutrality of England, France, Italy, and Japan.
- August 23 Sakarya offensive began.
- Sept. 13 Sakarya offensive ended.
- Oct. 20 Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora, often referred to as Franklin-Bouillon Agreement or Treaty of Angora.
- Oct. 22 Franco-Turkish Agreement ratified by Kemalists.
- Oct. 30 Franco-Turkish Agreement ratified by French.

1922

- Jan. 12 Cannes Conference between British representatives (Prime Minister Lloyd George and Earl Curzon) and Greek representatives MM. Gounaris and Baltzsis).
- Feb. 15 Greek premier Lord Curzon regarding desperate military situation in Asia Minor to which Lord Curzon replied that the Greek Government should await **conclusions** of the coming Allied conference. Gounaris' letter circulated to the British Cabinet but not noted by the British Premier and other responsible officials.
- March 9 Earl Montague of the Indian Office resigned following publication of Lord Reading's plea against depriving Turkey of Smyrna and European territory.
- March 22-
- April 15 Foreign ministers of England, France, and Italy met at Paris to discuss Graeco-Turkish problems and demands of Turkish nationalists for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres. On March 23 proposals for an armistice of three months was sent to Greek Government at Athens and to Turkish Governments at Angora and Constantinople. On March 25 the Greek Government accepted proposals with reservations. On March 26 the conference closed with signing of terms for revision of Sevres Treaty. On April 5 Angora accepted armistice proposals with reservation regarding Anatolia. On April 8 Constantinople accepted with reservation regarding Thrace. Acceptance was handed to Allied High Commissioners sent reply to Angora refusing to evacuate Anatolia.
- April 23 Angora Government informed Allies it would agree to preliminary discussion of peace terms.
- July 24 Class A mandates, Syria to France and Palestine to Great Britain, approved by Council of League of Nations.
- July 27-
29 Greek forces threatened occupation of Constantinople, opposed by Allied Powers. Greeks acquiesced on July 29.

1922 - continued

- July 30 M. Sterghiades proclaimed autonomy of Smyrna under Greek military protection.
- August 5 Lloyd George's speech against Kemalists in House of Commons.
- August 26 Final Turkish offensive began.
- August 28 Kemalist military operations result in speedy and complete rout of Greek forces involving very heavy losses in men and materials.
- Sept. 8 M. Sterghiades at Smyrna resigned.
- Sept. 9 Turkish troops entered Smyrna, followed by Mustapha Kemal Pasha two days later.
- Sept. 14 Smyrna conflagration.
- Sept. 16 Chanak crisis. Lloyd George made a military appeal against the Turks to the Dominions and Balkan states.
- Sept. 19 Poincare announced that France was not prepared to use force and advised British withdrawal from Chanak.
- Sept. 21 British refused to withdraw from Chanak.
- Sept. 23 France, Great Britain, and Italy requested an armistice. M. Franklin-Bouillon sent as special emissary.
- Sept. 29 Conference of Mudania.
- Oct. 11 Armistice of Mudania signed bringing an end to Turco-Greek war.
- Oct. 26 Invitations issued to Conference at Lausanne.
- Nov. 1 Grand National Assembly made supreme in Turkey.

1922 - continued

Nov. 19 Prime Minister Lloyd George resigned. Lord Curzon remained Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Nov. 20 First Lausanne Conference began.

Nov. 27 Reported that 250,000 non-Moslem inhabitants of northern Asia Minor fleeing.

Dec. 1 Allies agreed to an exchange of populations.

1922 - continued

Nov. 19 Prime Minister Lloyd George resigned. Lord Curzon remained Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Nov. 20 First Lausanne Conference began.

Nov. 27 Reported that 250,000 non-Moslem inhabitants of northern Asia Minor fleeing.

Dec. 1 Allies agreed to an exchange of populations.

1923

- Jan. 30 Graeco-Turkish Convention for Exchange of Populations signed at Lausanne, incorporated in the Treaty of Lausanne, July 24.
- Feb. 5 First Lausanne Conference concluded.
- March 6 The Grand National Assembly rejected the treaty draft but authorized the government to continue negotiations.
- April 23 Second Lausanne Conference opened.
- July 8 Accord reached at Lausanne between Ismet Pasha and the Allies.
- July 9 At a special meeting of the Angora Cabinet, Mustapha Kemal presiding authorized Ismet to sign peace terms.
- July 24 Peace terms signed between Turks and Allies at Lausanne. Separate treaty of peace signed between the Turks and Greeks.
- August 23 Grand National Assembly ratified the Treaty of Lausanne by a vote of 215 to 20.

APPENDIX B

THE ARMISTICE OF MUDROS

Conditions of an armistice agreed to and concluded between Vice Admiral the Nohorable Sir Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean station, acting under authority from the British Government, in agreement with their Allies, and His Excellency Rauf Bey, Ottoman minister of marine; His Excellency Richad Hikmet Bey, Ottoman under secretary for foreign affairs; Lieutenant-Colonel Saadullah Bey, Ottoman general staff, acting under authority from the Ottoman government.

1. Opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; access to the Black Sea; allied occupation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus forts.
2. The positions of all mine fields, torpedo tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters are to be indicated, and assistance is to be given to sweep and remove them as required.
3. All available information about mines in the Black Sea is to be communicated.
4. All allied prisoners of war as well as Armenian interned persons and prisoners are to be collected at Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.
5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except troops required for the surveillance of the frontiers and maintenance of internal order, the number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies, after consultation with the Turkish Government.
6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey, these ships to be interned in such Turkish ports as directed, except small vessels required for policy and similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

7. The Allies have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.
8. Free use of the Allied ships of all ports and anchorage now under Turkish occupation and denial of their use to the enemy; similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and demobilization of the army.
9. Use by the Allies of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.
10. Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.
11. Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish forces in northwestern Persia behind the prewar frontier, already ordered, and part of Transcaucasus to be evacuated by Turkish troops, as already ordered; the remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation.
12. All wireless, telegraph, and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.
13. Prohibition against destruction by the Turkish of any naval, military, or commercial material.
14. Facilities are to be given for the purchase of coal, oil, fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources after the requirements of the country have been met, and none of the above to be exported.
15. Allied control officers to be placed on all railways, including portions of the Transcaucasian railways under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due considerations being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum, and Turkey is to raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

16. Surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Assiryemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander. Withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order to be determined under clause 5.
17. Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison, Turkey to guarantee to stop supplies to and communications with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.
18. Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.
19. All Germans and Austrians, naval military and civilians, to be evacuated within one month from the Turkish dominions, those in the remote districts as soon after as possible.
20. Compliance with such orders as will be conveyed, regarding the disposal of the equipment, arms and ammunition, including the transport of the portion of the Turkish army to be demobilized under clause 5.
21. An Allied representative attached to the Turkish ministry of supplies to safeguard Allied interests. This representative is to be furnished with all that is necessary for this purpose.
22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied powers, the release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over the military age to be considered.
23. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve for themselves the right to occupy any part of them.
24. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.
25. Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey to cease from noon, local time, Thursday, the 31st day of October.¹

¹Mears, ed. Modern Turkey, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), pp. 625-26.

APPENDIX C
POPULATION STATISTICS
OF
AIDIN SUBDIVIDED

ACCORDING TO NATIONALITIES, 1912

Sand-laka	Kazas	Turks	Greeks	Arme- nians	Bul- garians	Jews	Other Nation- alities	Total
Smyrna	1 Smyrna and Nymphaon	96,250	243,879	7,628	415	16,450	51,872	416,494
	2 Vourla	4,445	40,670	—	—	15	360	45,390
	3 Krini	7,780	50,709	—	—	50	500	59,039
	4 Karabourni	8,600	15,510	—	—	—	—	24,110
	5 Sivri-hissar	9,830	11,667	—	—	40	100	21,637
	6 Palæa-phocæa	2,100	19,514	350	—	250	100	22,314
	7 Mene-men	10,309	11,216	508	—	100	1,500	23,533
	8 Kousadasi	8,775	11,052	59	—	140	200	20,226
	9 Baindir	9,300	6,850	150	—	25	—	16,325
	10 Thira	30,500	5,000	—	—	10	300	35,810
	11 Odemission	19,500	7,700	1,200	—	50	150	28,600
	12 Pergamos	23,735	25,277	1,500	—	1,000	586	61,098
		219,494	449,044	11,395	415	18,130	55,568	754,046
Magnisia	1 Magnisia	37,900	38,926	2,000	—	1,000	600	80,426
	2 Soma	5,000	1,800	—	—	—	—	6,800
	3 Kirka-gach	35,373	5,173	—	—	—	—	40,546
	4 Ak-hissar	14,500	9,588	882	—	—	—	24,970
	5 Kassaba	26,900	6,000	1,000	—	600	—	34,500
	6 Giordes	18,040	2,600	—	—	—	—	20,640
	7 Esmeh	26,138	750	—	—	—	—	26,888
	8 Demirdji	21,363	1,640	—	—	—	—	23,003
	9 Salihli	21,318	4,220	—	—	—	—	25,538
	10 Kula	13,747	6,950	—	—	—	—	20,697
	11 Alashehir	27,510	5,800	78	—	27	335	33,750
		247,776	83,625	3,960	—	1,627	935	337,923
Aidin	1 Aidin	46,578	19,982	300	—	1,800	114	68,664
	2 Sokia	12,987	25,801	59	—	—	—	38,847
	3 Tsina	24,975	550	1	—	—	—	25,526
	4 Bozdogan	27,945	1,500	—	—	14	—	29,459
	5 Nazli	50,069	6,800	274	—	120	—	57,263
		162,554	54,633	634	—	2,034	114	219,959
Denizli	1 Denizli	33,315	3,580	430	—	—	—	37,325
	2 Sarakeui	12,200	3,000	—	—	—	—	15,200
	3 Buladan	22,481	400	—	—	—	—	22,881
	4 Tsala	40,882	320	—	—	—	—	41,202
	5 Kara-agach	36,062	220	—	—	—	—	36,282
	6 Dawas	52,376	190	—	—	—	—	52,566
		197,317	7,710	430	—	—	—	205,457
Mentesa	1 Mugla	38,757	3,930	—	—	—	114	42,801
	2 Merineris	13,128	720	—	—	—	—	13,848
	3 Budrum	8,817	5,060	—	—	—	131	14,008
	4 Milassa	21,137	7,071	—	—	—	536	28,744
	5 Koltzé	18,560	1,800	—	—	—	—	20,360
	6 Makri	14,243	9,217	—	—	—	63	23,523
		113,700	27,798	—	—	—	644	142,142
Total of the Vilayet of Aidin		940,843	622,810	16,419	415	31,781	57,261	1,659,529

*

*Polybius, pseud. "Greece Before the Conference," (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1919), p. 113.

APPENDIX D
POPULATION STATISTICS
OF
SMYRNA ENCLAVE CEDED TO GREECE
BY
THE TREATY OF SEVRES

Cazas	Greeks	Armen- nians	Moslems ¹	Miscel- laneous ²	Total
Sandjak of Balikesser : Aivali	46,130	—	89	—	46,219
Sandjak of Smyrna :					
Smyrna	243,879	7,628	96,250	68,737	416,494
Vourla	40,670	—	4,445	275	45,390
Tchesmé	50,709	—	7,780	550	59,039
Karabounar	15,510	—	8,000	—	23,510
Sivri-Hissar	11,667	—	9,800	140	21,607
Phocaea	19,514	350	2,100	350	22,314
Koush-Adasi	11,052	59	8,775	340	20,226
Mainemen	11,216	508	10,309	1,600	23,633
Baindir	6,850	150	9,300	25	16,325
Tiré	5,000	—	20,500	310	25,810
Eudemish	7,700	1,200	19,500	200	28,600
Bergam	25,277	1,500	22,735	1,586	51,098
Sandjak of Magnissa :					
Magnissa	38,926	2,000	37,900	1,600	80,426
Akhissar	9,586	882	14,500	—	24,968
Cassaba	6,090	1,000	26,900	600	34,590
Total	549,776	15,277	298,883	76,313	940,249

¹ Turks, Circassians, Lazes, Albanians, Kizilbashis, &c.

² Foreign subjects, Jews, Bulgars. *

*Pallis, Alexander A. Greece's Anatolian Venture and After, 1915-1922. (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1937), p. 227.

APPENDIX E

TURCOPHILE ACCOUNT OF GREEK LANDING

On May 15 the Greek army landed in Smyrna before the Allied warships, which were there to see the occupation properly carried out. A military detachment went to the Government House, the governor, Izzet Bey (a prominent member of the Entent Liberales, hence a faithful friend of the Allies), was pulled out of the konak with the rest of the officials to the quay and made to cry, "Zito Venizelos!" (Long live Venizelos!) under the threat of bayonets. Their fezzes and dresses were torn and they were made to march on the quay for hours. In the meantime another detachment went to the Turkish barracks, where there was only a handful of soldiers, who hoisted the white flag by order of the commander, Nadir Pasha. But the Greeks opened fire all the same and dragged all the soldiers out, including the commander and the staff officers, tearing their headdresses and uniforms, and forcing them to cry, "Zito Venizelos!" Colonel Fethi and Major Shukri, two brave veterans who had refused to cry out in spite of bayonet thrusts - were added with a number of other officers to the large crowd of Turkish notables who were gradually dragged out of their homes and brought to the quay. The crowd of martyrs were a few thousand strong and included boys of twelve. All were marched from the konak up to Karshi-Yaka on the shore, bayoneted, torn, spat on, and tortured by the Greek soldiers or the native Christians, who had joined in either as spectators or murderers. The jeering and applauding as the mud-and blood-covered Turks succumbed one by one on the shore was tremendous. A few hundred died on the quay, the rest were taken to prisons in Smyrna or sent on the Greek warships. The waters near the shore were pink, according to the Smyrna people, and this spectacle of human slaughter by torture was calmly watched by the Allied warships, which were near enough to the shore to perceive the details of the show. While this jubilee went on in front of the fleets, the Greek soldiers and some native Christians were entering the Turkish houses in the back streets, robbing and killing the men and violating the women. In a week this celebration by murder, robbery, and rape went farther into Smyrna regions. So the Greek army sent by Mr. Lloyd George to civilize the Turks inaugurated its future work in this spectacular way.¹

¹Halide Edib, The Turkish Ordeal (New York: The Century Co., 1928), pp. 22-3.

APPENDIX F

KING-CRANE REPORT PART III AND SECTION V AND VI

V. Adalia and the Southwest. Italy's claim to the Southwest of Asia Minor rests upon nothing that is compatible with the principles of the Commission's instructions. There are no Italians native to the country, and no evidence exists that the population desires Italy as a mandatory over them. In this region the Moslem are to the Greek Orthodox Christians as ten to one. None of this area should be separated from Anatolia.

VI. Smyrna and the West. The problem of the west coast is a difficult one, not because of the intrinsic situation, but because of the persistency of the Greek Government in demanding an area there, and of the fact that a Greek army is in occupation.

Nowhere except perhaps in the Sandjak of Smyrna and certain coastal Kazas is the Greek Orthodox population in a majority, and the complete proof that it is in majority there awaits an impartial census. If any question existed previously as to the unwillingness of the majority of the population in the area now occupied by the Greeks to be annexed to Greece as a mandatory, the question has been answered by the circumstances of the occupation.* The question has also been answered as to whether the Balkan State of modern Greece has reached such a degree of civilization that it can be entrusted with mandatory rule over a people of different faith and hostile feeling.

The Greek army and all authority of the Greek Government ought to be withdrawn from an area where better order was kept by twelve British officers than can be maintained by one hundred thousand Greek troops. There can be no settled peace until either a Greek conquest has swept far to the interior, with great destruction of property and life, or until the Greek power is wholly removed. In the latter case the question would still remain: Should an area in Western Asia Minor be set off as a special Greek region and placed under a separate mandate? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:

(1) The character of the country is such that no good natural boundary can be found except high up in the hills. If such boundary be traced, the population within it would be so markedly Moslem (about three to one) that the area could have no special Greek character.

(2) If, on the other hand, a more or less arbitrary line be drawn farther west, it would not constitute a good barrier for defense against smugglers or brigand bands.

(3) Any line drawn now would be regarded, more or less, as an economic barrier, cutting off Smyrna and other coast cities from some of the trade with the interior, to mutual disadvantage.

(4) Neither Greeks nor Turks in Western Asia Minor would believe anything except that it is the intention of the League of Nations to permit Greece later to annex the territory set off, and perhaps to extend her holdings further. The elements would therefore be present for a Macedonia system of sustained brigand warfare, which could be kept down only by more military effort and expenditures than any mandatory power cares to assume.

Shall any measures be taken then to develop a special Greek area in Asia Minor? The maximum that would seem to be advisable at the present would be that a strong mandatory power should be entrusted with a single mandate for all Anatolia, and should take special pains to protect Greeks and Turks alike and preserve order in the west with the possibility of a limited locally autonomous Greek area. The question of a future separated Greek area could then be left in abeyance, to be brought up again if circumstances justify.¹

* This is an allusion to the massacres of Moslems by Greeks, and subsequent atrocities, upon the occasion of the landing at Smyrna May 15, 1915. An official Inter-Allied inquiry has confirmed the fact of the atrocities.

¹ "The King-Crane Report on the Near East. A Suppressed Official Document of the United States Government." Editor and Publisher, December, 1922, p. xvii.

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